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INTRODUCTION

Practice as a lawyer often requires some degree of conversance
with other disciplines-at the least, an ability to know when to seek

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss4/4

2

Meier: Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal P
1993]

INTEGRATING PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

the assistance of other types of professionals or experts.' The need
for an interdisciplinary approach is especially compelling in the field
of domestic violence, an issue which cuts across psychology, sociology, public policy, criminology, medicine, public health, and law.' In
practice, psychologists and social workers who work with battered
women or batterers often need to learn about and interact with the
legal system, which may define the framework within which treatment

will be administered, or may be needed to protect a victim against
further violence. Conversely, lawyers representing battered women in
both civil and criminal cases often need to consult with psychological
experts, as expert witnesses or court examiners in their cases, or to
obtain assistance for the client or her children. More fundamentally,
society's growing awareness of the pervasiveness and severity of

domestic violence has been the combined result of the socio-political
movement for womens' rights and a process of social re-education
about the psychology of women, men and families. A changing political climate has made new understandings of the psychology of domestic violence possible; these new theories and perspectives have
also informed social mores and the law

As a result of the increased publicity about domestic violence
over the past ten years, both the legal and social science professions'

attention to this field has exponentially multiplied.4 There are now
1. Interdisciplinary work is especially common in family law. See, e.g., Barbara
Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice to Life, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1977 (1993) (adequate teaching and practicing in family law requires grasp of other
disciplines, especially psychology); Noel Zaal, Family Law Teaching in the No-Fault Era: A
Pedagogic Proposal, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 552 (1985) (arguing for a family law program
which would include the study of social science and other relevant disciplines). But cf infra
notes 13-19 regarding the detrimental impact some psychological approaches to family law
have had, both in denying and minimizing domestic violence and in undercutting the rights
of women and children in family law cases.
2. Indeed, domestic violence was initially seen as a hodgepodge of pre-existing disciplines, unworthy of treatment as a single field. See, e.g., Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry,
Family Violence in Perspective, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 7 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds.,
1984). However, in the last ten years domestic violence has acquired the status of a recognized "field" in the social sciences. See, e.g., Brief of Arnicus Curiae of American Psychological Association in Support of Defendant-Petitioner in New Jersey v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364
(NJ. 1984) (stating that study of battered women is "well-developed" in "scientific community"). It remains relevant to many different types of legal practice, including criminal prosecution, criminal defense, civil protection, tort law, and family law.
3. As is discussed infra part II, both contemporary and historical social attitudes toward
domestic violence have been shaped profoundly by the psychological professions. However,
cultural norms are also a function of personal and social attitudes and beliefs.
4. See Developments in the Law: Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1574 (1993)
[hereinafter Developments] (surveying developments in the law regarding domestic violence);
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more than a dozen scholarly social science journals devoted to family
violence and a vast published literature.' In the legal field, the literature has also exploded, and changes in the law on both the state and

federal level are now a constant occurrence. 6 Not surprisingly, the
subject has also become increasingly visible in law schools. As of
this writing, at least eighteen schools teach courses on domestic violence: the majority of these courses are clinical programs."
This Article examines the integration of psychology into legal
thought and practice concerning domestic violence. Part II briefly
surveys the interaction between law and psychology in the development of social and legal perspectives on domestic violence. This history demonstrates both that politics and law affect psychological perspectives and that psychology informs the law. Because it is increasingly clear that psychological theories about domestic violence must
take into account its legal and socio-historical context, it is particular-

Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Response to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of
Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993) (surveying social science literature); infra part lI.B.2.b.
5. Some examples include the Journal of Family Violence, Journal of Interpersonal
Violence, Violence and Victims, and Journal of Traumatic Stress. See Dutton, supra note 4.
6. This Symposium is indicative of the growing interest in domestic violence in legal
academia. However, this attention is not limited to academia. For instance, in the last four
years, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (the "NCJFCJ") has commissioned and published a series of cutting edge reports on domestic violence and state civil,
criminal, and statutory law. See, e.g., BARBARA HART, STATE CODES ON DOMESTIC VIoLENCE: ANALYSIS, COMMENTARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992) (prepared for the NCJFCJ);
NCJFCJ, FAMILY VIOLENCE: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE (1990); NCJFCJ, MODEL STATE
CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (1994). The New York-based National Center on
Women and Family Law has long provided extensive legal resources and materials on domestic violence. In addition, four "special issue" and national resource centers on domestic violence have recently been established pursuant to federal grants. These include the National
Resource Center. located at the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence (the
"PCADV"), and three other resource centers: one spread among the PCADV, the National
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, and the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (all three harboring the Battered Women's Justice Project); the San Francisco
Family Violence Prevention Fund (health care); and the NCJFCJ (child placement). These
centers should expand the growth and dissemination of many kinds of information concerning
battering.
7. These numbers are based on research by Mithra Merryman, and my own informal
survey of domestic violence courses in law schools. See Mithra Merryman, A Survey of Domestic Violence Programs in Legal Education, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 383, 387 (1994). Included in this statistic are civil or family litigation clinics which teach about domestic violence as one of several subject areas, e.g., the "Families and the Law" Clinic at Catholic
University and the "Family Law Clinic" at University of Baltimore Law School. Merryman, a
more recent graduate than myself, decries legal education as "virtually ignor[ing]" domestic
violence. Id. at 383. One's perspective on this issue undoubtedly depends on one's frame of
refeience.
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ly important that the social science and legal professions continue to
communicate and collaborate in developing further understandings of
domestic violence.
The remainder of the Article discusses the benefits of applying
this integration to legal practice, in the form of the interdisciplinary
teaching of a domestic violence legal clinic by a lawyer and psychologist. In part III, I offer a description of one model of such an interdisciplinary program, the George Washington University National Law
Center's Domestic Violence Advocacy Project (the "DVAP").' I then
describe the contributions of psychology to both substantive advocacy
and lawyering skills in the training context. The interdisciplinary approach can teach students to be strong advocates in domestic violence
cases by providing them with a richer substantive understanding of
the dynamics of domestic violence and by exposing them firsthand to
the use of social science experts in such cases. The psychological
perspective is also extremely helpful in the development of students'
lawyering skills, both in representation of battered women, and in
general. Incorporation of this perspective into the clinical teaching
context can also assist teachers and students in navigating the personal and professional challenges inherent in this work.
I end by discussing some of the challenges and limitations inherent in the integration of psychology into the clinical legal setting. I
conclude that thoughtful consideration of the differences between the
disciplines and the limits of an effective interdisciplinary approach to
teaching young lawyers is a beneficial means of clarifying both our
concept of the lawyering role and the potential contributions of psychology to that role.
11.

THEORY-THE EVOLVING INTERACTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND

LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The history of the development of legal and psychological understandings of domestic violence9 over time is a study of law as both

8. I first designed and taught the Domestic Violence Advocacy Project in the 1993-94
school year. My discussion of the program in this Article is thus to some extent tentative.
However, I believe the best teaching is that which is constantly re-invented; hence. I do not
ever expect to reach "definitive" and changeless conclusions.
9. Terminology in this field is unsatisfying: the phrase "domestic violence" is felt by
some to be trivializing of the criminal nature of this behavior, and also inaccurately genderneutral; the phrase "battered woman" is problematic because it suggests that those women
who have experienced violence from an intimate are a particular type, e.g., weak, helpless,
passive, or otherwise abnormal. See ANN JONES, NEXT TIME SHE'LL BE DEAD 81-87 (1994);
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product and generator of social norms. Although the following discussion does not purport to be comprehensive, an overview of the interaction between psychological and legal approaches to this subject
demonstrates that each has always informed the other. As the legal
and political context has both changed and resisted change with respect to womens' rights and domestic violence, however, psychological and social science perspectives have increasingly moved away
from a neutral scientific or "medical model" to a variety of more
interdisciplinary "psychosocial" models which explicitly take into account the socio-historical context, increasingly including the reality of
gender oppression. 0 In turn, these broader socio-political perspectives
on battering offer significant potential for reducing gender bias in the
legal treatment of domestic violence, as long as they continue to be
informed by the experiences of battered women in the courts.
A.

Historically-FromLegally Normative to
Psychologically Pathological

The history of legal approval of wife-beating in western culture
is by now fairly well-known. As eloquently stated by Dobash and
Dobash, "[t]he use of physical violence against ... wives is not the
only means by which they are controlled and oppressed but it is one
of the most brutal and explicit expressions of patriarchal domination."" Dating back to the Roman Empire, western laws and social
mores called for "chastisement" of wives by husbands when their
patriarchal authority or female restrictions were challenged. The right
of physical control, gradually outlawed in the British and American
common law by the turn of the century, was only a concrete extension of the lengthy history of social norms legitimating male authority
and female subordination in the family and society generally. t2

Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REv. 1, 24-30 (1991). These connotations are inaccurate for many women who
have experienced violence from male intimates. Id. at 30 & n.119 (feminists and "strong"
women also get battered). Many writers prefer "wife" abuse or "wife beating" as a more
accurate reflection of the gendered nature of domestic violence and its historic normative
roots in the law governing the family. Recognizing the problematic connotations of most
terms in this field, I reluctantly take the path of least resistance and use the simplest, most
recognizable labels. My use of "wife abuse" is intended to include unmarried partners.
10. 1 am grateful to Evan Stark for his help in formulating the shift from "medical"
models to more "psychosocial" models.
11. R. EMERSON DOBASH & RussELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES at ix (1979).
12. Id. at 62-64, 74. This thumbnail sketch does not reflect the far more complex ebb
and flow of social and legal changes and attempted changes concerning wife-beating over the
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The removal of official legal permission for wife-beating did not
mean its elimination, however. In this century, precisely because it
was no longer legally dictated behavior, the existence, nature and
causes of domestic violence all became contested. In this context,
psychological theories about women, men and the family have played
a significant role in shaping legal and social views. Thus, in the
1930s, the rise of Freudian psychoanalytic thought, while viewing

family violence as deviant and unhealthy, focused on female "masochism" as the reason for womens'
"pathologizing" of domestic violence

victimization."

The

reflected and reinforced the societal belief that spouse abuse was an
isolated problem in unusually disturbed couples in which the violence was viewed as "fulfilling masochistic needs of the wife and
necessary for the wife's (and the couple's) equilibrium."' 4
Although Freudian concepts of "female masochism" are less in
favor today," modem psychiatric evaluations still frequently diagnose

battered women as "paranoid," or having any of a number of character disorders such as "Schizoid Personality Disorder," "Borderline

Personality," "Dependent Personality Disorder," etc. 6 Other psycholast century and a half. As both the Dobashes and other noted historians of society's response to family violence have described, various efforts were made by different segments of
society at different times to reduce family violence, punish wife-beaters, and protect women
and children. See id. at 1-74; LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LiVES: THE POLITICS
AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO ThE PRESENT (1987); see also Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal Approaches to Family Violence,
1649-1980, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 19-53 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds. 1989). The consistent theme throughout time has been, however, society's unwillingness to accept the fundamental changes in the status and independence of women which would be necessary to truly
minimize or end male violence toward women and children in the family. Id.
13. See PLECK, supra note 12, at 158. Pleck points out that Freud himself, author of
the concept of female masochism, never applied the concept to wife-beating. Strikingly, it
was a female disciple of Freud, Helene Deutsch, who first propounded the theory that female
masochism explained some violence against women. Id. at 158-59 (citing Helene Deutsch,
The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women, 11 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS
48-60 (1930)).
14. Elaine Hilberman, Overview: The 'Wife-Beater's Wife' Reconsidered, in THE GENDER
GAP IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 213 (Elaine Hilberman Carmen & Patricia Rieker eds., 1984).
15. But cf Laura Crites and Donna Coker, What Therapists See that Judges May Miss,
JUDGES' J., Spring 1988, at 42 (psychotherapists unfamiliar with domestic violence often label
victim as having "self-defeating (masochistic) personality disorder").
16. These were the labels applied by a forensic psychiatrist appointed by the court to
examine the parties in a custody and visitation case I have been litigating for two years. The
case will be referred to hereafter as "Custody Case" to protect the privacy of the parties. See
also JONES, supra note 9, at 149 (describing story of woman who was diagnosed as "para-
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logical approaches to the family, such as "family systems therapy,"
have similarly avoided blaming the aggressor, emphasizing that every

familial interaction is explainable as the product of the interactive
"family system," with no one person responsible. This approach,
which has also informed judicial perspectives on family violence,

treats violence between spouses as a deviant malfunction in the mutual interaction between the parties. 7
Until quite recently, the psychological professions have paid little
attention to wife-beaters. 8 However, when subject to evaluation,
batterers have typically tested psychiatrically normal on standard
psychiatric tests. 9 Thus, while batterers' victims are frequently seen
as pathological, the batterers themselves are often seen as mentally
normal. Little better evidence exists that, although the letter of the
law has changed, the underlying normative values, whereby mens'

violent domination of women in the family is socially accepted behavior, remain."

noid" when she checked herself into a mental hospital after narrowly escaping from a husband who had shot at her twice).
17. GORDON, supra note 12, at 282-85 (describing from 1940s on, increasing social
denial of wife-beating and social workers' use of euphemisms like "marital discord," and
emphasis on avoidance of "blaming"); Mahoney, supra note 9, at 48 and accompanying notes
(citing RICHARD A. STORDEUR & RICHARD STILLE, ENDING MEN'S VIOLENCE AGAINST THEIR
PARTNERS: ONE ROAD TO PEACE 25-26 (1989)).
18. To some extent, psychological professionals' focus on female victims has been the
natural result of the fact that researchers have understandably studied the population with
whom they work. Unlike victims, batterers rarely voluntarily seek treatment or help from
social workers, and are typically unwilling to admit to having a problem. See GORDON, supra
note 12, at 281; David Adams, Identifying the Assaultive Husband in Court: You Be the
Judge, BOSTON BJ., July-Aug. 1989, at 23-25. Unfortunately, this practical circumstance has
contributed to the pathologizing of battered women.
19. Evan Stark, Framing and Reframing Battered Women, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 287 (Eva Buzawa ed. 1993) (batterers often test "normal" despite the presence of extraordinary need for control, defensiveness, anger, lack of empathy for
mother or children, and denial of abuse, including sometimes substance abuse). However, it
should be noted that in my custody case. supra note 16, the psychiatrist evaluated the
batterer as having more severe character disorders than the woman. Both of his "diagnoses"
appear to have been based purely on his interviews with them; no particular tests were administered.
20. See GORDON, supra note 12, at 3-4 ("family violence has been historically and
politically constructed," and is understandable only with knowledge of that history). The attitude of many judges, that if an accused batterer appears "normal" he cannot be guilty of the
violence of which he is accused, is thus completely counter to reality. See Joan Meier, The
Connection between Domestic Violence and Child, Abuse: A Study in System Failure, Paper
presented at Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, Family Law Section, at 7 (Jan. 7, 1994) (recounting reported statement by Maryland judge who denied a protection order on the ground that he did not believe the woman's claimed fear of the man
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Nonetheless, by characterizing family violence as aberrant and
victims as psychologically flawed, or at least equally responsible,
these psychological models have lent "scientific" validity to societal
denial of the pervasiveness and socially determined aspect of domestic
violence. These views have also supported society's reluctance to treat
domestic violence as a crime, and its tendency to fault victims as

much as (or more than) the perpetrators. Thus, prior to the 1970s,
little legal recourse was available for female victims of intimate violence. Police would rarely, if ever, arrest for a "family disturbance."
Divorce was unavailable or economically and socially infeasible.2
This is not to say that no interventions or social services were ever
obtained by battered women.' However, such interventions continued
to treat the violence as a "marital" problem, and, because of the

emphasis on maintaining family unity and womens' subordinate role,
little if any legal intervention was brought to bear which actually en-

forced an end to violence.
B. The Battered Womens' Movement-Seeking Justice
With the coming of the civil rights movement and the womens'
rights movement, both the legal and psychological approaches to
domestic violence began to change. Without recognition of womens'
rights to equality, their victimization had been invisibleY As the

because the man did not appear "sick" to him; the man subsequently killed the woman) (on
file with author).
21. See, e.g., GORDON. supra note 12, at 160 (social service agencies in 1950s hostile
to divorce); PLECK, supra note 12, at 141.
22. Elizabeth Pleck and Linda Gordon both detail a spectrum of "social" interventions
which battered women over the past century could sometimes obtain: for instance, child protection agency social workers would sometimes seek arrest or counseling for a wife-beater, or
threaten the removal of the children. GORDON, supra note 12, at 46-58; PLECK, supra note
12, at 69-87. Pleck also writes that after the turn of the century, complaints of domestic
violence could be brought before the new "family" or "domestic relations" courts, which explicitly sought to cultivate a non-criminal, non-legal approach to family cases. Such courts
would typically respond to complaints of violence with recommendations to "reconcile," or
orders for marital counseling. Id. at 125-44. Despite the progress since then toward legal
recognition of womens' legal rights in connection with the family, domestic relations courts
today still retain more than a little of the early courts' patronizing and non-rights-based attitude toward family litigants. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional
Language and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727
(1988).
23. In her path-breaking work on society's responses to survivors of man-made traumas
such as war, incest, and battering, Judith Herman notes that a social context which recognizes
the injustice done to victims is necessary before the reality of victims' severe psychological
traumas can be acknowledged. JuDrrH L. HERMAN, TRAUMA & RECOVERY: THE AFrERMATH
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political culture changed, domestic violence began to be recognized as
both much more prevalent than previously thought and severe enough
to be treated as criminal behavior for which the perpetrator is respon-

sible.24 Over the past twenty years battered womens' activists have
successfully fought, through lawsuits and legislation, for increased
arrest and criminal prosecution of batterers, for civil laws in all states

providing for civil protection orders (with criminal penalties for violation), for elevated consideration of domestic violence in custody litigation, and for incorporation of psychological knowledge about battering into the criminal defense of women charged with homicide for
killing their batterers. 5 As a result of this massive increase in legal
remedies for and attention to domestic violence, battered womens'
stories are now frequently heard in the legal system; and their needs,
their rights, and those of their children and their abusers are routinely
adjudicated. However, as the following suggests, the societal resistance to victims' stories and needs for protection has not disappeared:
the battle has simply moved to new, and more complex, planes.

OF VIOLENCE-FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 8-9 (1992). Herman states that

the post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") suffered by soldiers in war, as well as abused
women and children, was not uncovered until socio-political movements arose which advocated for the rights of veterans, and subsequently, women and children. See also PLECK, supra
note 12, at 159-60 (noting that the lack of popular or professional acceptance of the progressive psychoanalytic theories of Karen Homey during the 1930s, was because "without a vigorous women's movement, the intellectual debate about the nature of womanhood was silenced, and there was no audience for an alternative female psychology").
24. See Robert T. Sigler & Ida M. Johnson, The Criminalization of Domestic Abuse, 16
CRiM J. REv. 181 (1991) (Introduction to series of articles). But cf. Franklin Zimring, Legal
Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. REV. 521, 534 (1987) (questioning the efficacy
of criminal justice solutions to family violence). National Crime Survey statistics indicate that
2.1 million women are beaten each year, surveys consistently show that between one-fifth and
one-fourth of all marital or cohabiting relationships experience at least one incident of violence; approximately two thirds of separated or divorced women report violence in their former relationships. See generally Irene Frieze & Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage, in
FAMILY VIOLENCE 177-80 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds. 1989) (surveying data on
prevalence of adult intimate violence); Evan Stark, Spouse Abuse, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA:
A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH (Mark L. Rosenberg and Mary Ann Fenley eds. 1991) (estimating one-fifth of adult women have been abused in current or former relationships). More
women receive medical treatment for battering than for stranger rape, mugging and auto accidents combined. Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Violence Among Intimates: An Epidemiological
Review, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (Vincent B. Van Hasselt ed., 1987).
25. See generally Developments, supra note 4.
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1. The Limits of Enlightenment: The First Social Science
Theories
The legal reforms described above were fueled in large part by
an infusion of psychological and sociological research, which has
provided an empirical, psychological and sociological basis for
activists' contentions that domestic violence is in fact widespread and
severe.26 The first and most famous of these theories was the "battered woman syndrome," coined by psychologist Lenore Walker based
on a study of several hundred women, to describe the psychological
effects of longterm exposure to a battering relationship. Walker's
articulation of the "cycle of violence" and "learned helplessness"
posited psychological interpretations to explain the destructive psychological impact of longterm abuse, and how it is that women can
remain subject to such abuse over an extended period of time.
Analogizing to scientific research on dogs, Walker theorized that the
experience of repeated and un-preventable abuse, along with social
conditioning of women for subservience, created in battered women a
state of "psychological paralysis" which rendered them unable to seek
escape or help, even when it might be available.'
The battered woman syndrome was a watershed in social and
legal understandings of domestic violence. Walker's research offered
numerous powerful examples of extreme long-term abuse of women
by their male partners, and conveyed the hopelessness and demoralization of such victims. Unlike past psychological theories, Walker
showed that womens' difficulties were a natural response to the
abuse, rather than the result of any innate psychological tendencies
toward "masochism." Moreover, Walker's research highlighted the
extreme terrorizing to which some battered women are subjected.
Thus, whereas in the past, womens' killing of their abusers had typically only been legally defended as a form of "insanity," expert testimony about the "syndrome" now offered the opportunity to tell the
woman's story in such a way that the jury would understand that the
killing was "reasonable" self-defense, because it would show that the
woman understandably believed she had to kill to save herself."

26. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 4, at 1209-14 (literature survey).
27. See LENoRE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN 43 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 4, at 1574-80; Elizabeth Schneider, Describing
and Changing: Womens' Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 195, 215 (1986). In the past five years, several states have
also adopted legislation explicitly making expert testimony about the "battered woman syndrome" admissible in certain cases, and several governors have granted clemency petitions on
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Nonetheless, invoking the battered woman syndrome has not
always advanced justice for battered women. The problems with the
syndrome have been extensively discussed in the recent legal and

social science literature.29 In brief, the focus on the victim's "learned
helplessness" and psychological "syndrome" to explain battering relationships has been turned around and used by judges, prosecutors, and
juries, as another means of "blaming the victim."' In some criminal
cases, the focus on the woman's internal psychic state has been used
to show that her killing was not "reasonable," especially if the danger
to her was not obviously "imminent."' In custody or neglect/abuse
cases it has been used to show she is an "unfit" parent, because she
suffers from the "syndrome" of "learned helplessness."32 More fundamentally, the very concept of learned helplessness creates a narrow
stereotype of the archetypal woman entitled to claim victimization as
a "battered woman." When the facts of individual cases portray wom-

en with some capacity for action, aggressiveness, or independence, as
so many do, the theory has been used to argue that they did not have
"learned helplessness," did not suffer from the battered woman syn-

behalf of battered women who were convicted and imprisoned without the benefit of such
testimony. But cf. Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991) (arguing that new laws
are unnecessary and may backfire).
29. See Mahoney, supra note 9, at 34-43; Schneider, supra note 28, at 215; Elizabeth
Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work
on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 520 (1992); Stark, supra note 19, at 277-88; Dutton,
supra note 4, at 1194-1201.
30. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing phenomenon of blaming the
victim as a form of denial which makes observer feel less threatened).
31. Charles Ewing's review of twenty-six cases in which expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome was admitted, found seventeen in which the defendant was convicted of
murder, manslaughter, or reckless homicide. CHARLES EWING, BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL
(1987). Ewing cites a New York case in which the prosecutor successfully argued that "the
very ongoing nature of the abuse prove[d] that [defendant] was under no imminent danger . . . " the night she killed her batterer. Id. at 3.
32. See Stark, supra note 19, at 283 (citing In re Betty J., 371 S.E.2d 326, 332 (W.Va.
1988)) (judge removed child from mother on ground that she suffered from battered woman
syndrome, and is likely to reconcile with the abuser, thereby putting child at risk); Hearings
on H.R. Con. Res. 172 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental ReL of the
Comm. of the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 101, 109 (testimony of Carla Goodwin
and Donald A. Gordon); Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from the Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 257
& n.30 (1993) (several jurisdictions reported judges giving custody to batterers where
mothers' behavior was seen as "unstable" or "erratic"); Mahoney, supra note 9, at 46-47
(noting contradiction between "image" of battered women as "helpless" and image of her as
"fit" mother).
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drome, and therefore the battering could not justify their killing, e.g.,
they could not have acted in self-defense.33 As a result, many women continue to be convicted of murder and manslaughter for killing
the person who repeatedly brutally attacked and promised to kill
them,' because either the expert testimony is excluded,3' or it is
admitted but turned against the victim when she deviates from the
image of the perfect victim.'
A similar pattern can be seen in the impact of social science
research addressing the connection between spousal abuse and harm
to children. Although it has seemed to many to be self-evident that

33. Since Walker's study was based primarily on the experiences of white, middle class
women, the battered woman syndrome has been a particular problem for minority or working
class women, who do not appear to juries to fit social images of "helplessness.' See Sharon
Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA
WOMEN'S LJ. 191 (1991) (African-American women unlikely to benefit from battered woman
syndrome because of widely held stereotypes of women of color as, e.g., aggressive and
strong); Stark, supra note 19, at 281-82 (most battered women are aggressive in fighting back
and seeking safety, and many are angry, contradicting social images of "helplessness;" poor
or non-white women are least likely to "fit" the stereotype).
34. I do not mean to suggest that all battered women who kill their abusers should be
fully acquitted. Holly Maguigan argues that a fair trial is one in which the defendant can put
before the jury the information which would put her actions in their "social context," i.e., the
history of abuse and threats, and show the connection of that context to her claim of self-defense. Maguigan, supra note 28, at 383. I question whether juries are capable of "fair" assessments of women who kill their batterers without some explicit balancing of the scales to
negate the gender bias implicit in social conditioning concerning, e.g., the "reasonableness" of
women's and men's use of force. For instance, it appears that battered women who kill their
abusers receive far harsher treatment in the criminal justice system than batterers who kill
their wives. Sarah M. Bud, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence Cases in the United States:
An Overview, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DEFENDING BATrERED WOMEN IN CRIMINAL
CASES 13-16 (1992). However, the point is theoretical, since even the Maguigan standard of
fairness is often not met. Maguigan, supra note 28, at 387-88.
35. Syndrome evidence has been excluded on a variety of legal grounds, including the
ground that the defendant does not fit the "reasonable battered woman" standard which some
jurisdictions have adopted as an alternative to traditional, general "reasonableness." See
Maguigan, supra note 28, at 439-42.
36. The need to portray battered women as completely helpless in order to "merit"
victimhood, is one unfortunate result of the use of "learned helplessness" to define battered
women. However, Walker's use of this phrase clearly tapped into a widespread conviction
that only a completely paralyzed person would be unable to escape or end violence at the
hands of an intimate partner. Unfortunately, the reality is otherwise, as a result of a virtual
absence of social support or protection from family violence. See infra part H.B.2.c (describing "entrapment" theory of battering). Concern about the ways that the "victim" image has
been used against many battered women, and seems to ignore their many strengths, has led
many to question use of the term "victim" altogether. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 28, at
529-30. However, in my view, "victimization" still describes anyone who has been unjustly
harmed by another, many strong, capable and aggressive people can be "victimized." Indeed,
a natural response to being victimized is rage. HERMAN, supra note 23, at 189-90.
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when a father violently attacks a mother, the children will suffer,
custody courts routinely reject battered womans' claims of abuse as
fabrications, exaggerations, or irrelevant to the welfare of the chil-

dren.37 Thus, one (typical) court stated "[a] person may be violent
and vindictive towards a spouse and yet be the best, most loving,
caring, parent in the world."38 Courts have even awarded custody to
fathers who killed the childrens' mother, on the ground that the violence against the childrens' mother was not directed toward the children and did not indicate the father would be a poor parent. 9
Social science research on the impact of spouse abuse on children, has been helpful in countering this dismissiveness. t' The studies consistently show what common sense dictates: that living in
homes where domestic violence takes place is profoundly traumatic
and destructive for children, and that men who beat their female
partners are more likely to abuse their children, both violently and

sexually.4 The research has been even more successful in affecting

37. See Meier, supra note 20, at 1, 4-9.
38. Naomi Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on
Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1073 (1991) (quoting Hearings on H.
Con. Res. 172 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the

House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)). One Massachusetts judge, in
refusing to deny the batterer visitation rights with the children, said "Even Dillinger could
have made a good father ....
MONTHLY, May 1987, at 40.

How about Manson?" Joan Meier. Battered Justice, WASH.

39. Meier, supra note 20, at 8 (citing In re Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d 976 (Ill. App. 1988)).
40. This is especially necessary with respect to visitation. Even in cases where the abuser has threatened repeatedly to kill the child, has assaulted the child, etc., courts are loath to
deny non-custodial fathers visitation. In the custody case mentioned above, we attempted to
counter the great reluctance of the court to restrict or terminate visits, with expert testimony
by sociologist Evan Stark. Dr. Stark testified that the studies show extensive harm to children
from spouse abuse, the abuser's need to dominate and control the mother and child, and his
lack of empathy for child and mother represent a risk to mother and child, and that the
child's psychological health requires a mother who is safe and secure. Report of Evan Stark,
Custody Case, supra note 16, at 5. Dr. Stark also noted that research indicates that such men
often use access to their children as simply another means of extending their control over
and torture of the mother, conduct he termed "tangential spouse abuse.' Il; see also Stark,
supra note 19, at 287 (describing successful use of "tangential spouse abuse" theory in another custody case). My custody case had not been finally resolved as this Article went to
press, but supervised visits continued to be ordered.
41. See HART, supra note 6, at 29-36; NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY
LAW, THE EFFECT OF WOMAN ABUSE ON CHILDREN (1991); Cahn, supra note 38, at 1055-

58; see also Developments, supra note 4, at 1609-11. Children are frequently caught in the
cross-fire or harmed when trying to protect their mother, and their emotional torment from
witnessing such abuse is evidenced by behavioral, somatic and emotional problems similar to
those experienced by abused children. Moreover, the research suggests that approximately half
of the men who beat their wives also abuse their children. Lee Bowker et al., On the Rela-
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legislative policymaking: Numerous states and the United States Congress have in the last few years passed legislation calling for state
courts to consider evidence of spouse abuse in custody determinations, thereby mandating a transformation in traditional judicial approaches to the issue.42 In many instances, the statutes have explicitly cited the social science findings concerning harm to children from
spouse abuse.43
Unfortunately, this research too, can be turned against battered

women. Thus, evidence of the harm to children from spouse abuse is
sometimes pointed to as another reason to criticize the victim of
battering, for "subjecting the children" to it. Legally, a batterer's
abuse of children is more likely to be held against the mother than
the father in an action for neglect or abuse, even if the mother is a
co-victim along with the children." Although battered women frequently valiantly struggle to protect their children from abuse, if they
cannot protect themselves they are unlikely to be able to protect or
adequately nurture their children.4' Despite the failure of the community to provide protection to women who are battered and stalked, to
sanction abusers, or even to adequately protect children,' criminal

sanctions against mothers who are co-victims of violence are common.47

tionship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, in FEMINIST PERSPECIVES ON WIFE ABUSE
(Kersti Yllo and Michele Bograd eds., 1988).
42. Congress' House Concurrent Resolution 172 actually calls for adoption of a presumption against custody to batterers, as do some states; others merely require courts to
consider domestic violence as a factor in custody decisions. See HART, supra note 6, at 32
(chart of custody codes, indicating that a sizeable majority require consideration of domestic
violence); NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, MODEL CODE ON
DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (1994) (establishing presumption and requiring visitation
only if safe).
43. See, e.g., H. R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
44. See Schneider, supra note 28, at 551-52 & n.135; Stark, supra note 19, at 286.
Child protection social workers have historically tended to hold women rather than men responsible for most problems affecting children in the family. GORDON, supra note 12, at 73;
Fineman, supra note 22, at 101. Thirty-five states include omissions or "failure to protect" in
their definition of child abuse; only three state codes provide an affirmative defense based on
risk to the parent or child from intervention. HART, supra note 6, at 79.
45. See Stark. supra note 19, at 287 ("[C]hildren's best interest is served by ending the
entrapment process typical of battering . .. a woman's physical and psychological security is
a minimal precondition for the nurturance and continuity of care children require.").
46. See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (child who was known by child protection agency to be at risk, and was beaten into
permanent brain damage, had no substantive due process right to protection by state from
father's violence).
47. Schneider, supra note 28, at 553 n.143 (citing cases). This issue is not an easy one.
I do not mean to suggest that all criminal actions against mothers for failure to protect are
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This recasting of theories and arguments intended to demonstrate
the battered woman's victimization by the abuser, into a vehicle for
blaming the victim, is merely one aspect of a larger pattern of resis-

tance to battered womens' claims. Gender bias studies, as well as the
common experience of lawyers in the field, make clear that courts in
all kinds of domestic violence cases continue to treat claims of domestic violence with disdain, disbelief and dismissiveness Courts,
police and prosecutors frequently reject claims of violence and pleas

for help, on the ground that if the violence were real the woman
would have left; if she stayed, it must not be true.49 Women em-

broiled in custody disputes with their abusers are frequently accused
of "abandoning" their families, "kidnapping" their children or having

"emotional instability" when they flee violence, and punished by
being denied custody.5 0

unjust, although I believe some are; for purposes of this discussion, the essential point is that

social science evidence of harm to children can be and is used against battered women as
well as on their behalfs.
48. See Czapanskiy, supra note 32 (summarizing numerous examples of courts' rejections of battered womens' claims as non-credible or exaggerated); Meier, supra note 20, at 411 (describing courts' rationales for rejecting claims of domestic violence in custody context,
and drawing on numerous examples from literature and experience). In my custody case, my
client's claims of years of terrorizing by the father were characterized as "exaggerated" and
"bizarre" by the psychiatric evaluator, based purely on an interview. The judge characterized
the allegations of violence as "mudslinging" and expressed disgust with both parties for their
completely contradictory stories. The judge's attitude continued despite medical records and
stabwounds proving my client was stabbed in the face and shoulder, numerous police reports,
petitions for protection, and at least one witness corroborating threats by the abuser to kill
the mother, child and himself.
49. See, e.g., Blair v. Blair, 575 A.2d 191, 193 (Vt. 1990) (reprimanding trial court for
finding that "the strangling with the hands and violence and threats that were described . . .
have been blown way out of proportion as evidenced by the fact that she stayed throughout
the four years of marriage"). Unlike the Blair case, most trial court opinions expressing this
sentiment are not appealed. See Czapanskiy, supra note 48, at 252 (citing Maryland judge
who told a woman seeking a protection order "I don't believe anything that you're saying . . . because . . . [i]f I was you and someone had threatened me with a gun, there is no

way that I would continue to stay with them. There is no way that I could take that kind of
abuse from them. Therefore, since I would not let that happen to me, I can't believe that it
happened to you").
50. Angela Browne tells of a woman who decided to leave her husband with their
infant son, after three incidents of violence or threats. After she left, the husband filed for
custody, claiming his wife was "emotionally unstable" as exemplified by her "unexplained
disappearance" (the woman had written him a letter telling him why she left and that she
and the child were fine). When the woman appeared in court for a protection order, her son
was removed from her, and placed in foster care with the abuser's family. The woman's
access to her son was increasingly restricted as the husband continued to make unfounded
allegations of neglect against her. In private the husband warned her that if she did not come
back to him, she would lose her son completely. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BAT'rERED WOM-
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The widespread skepticism with which battered womens' claims
are received by social agencies and courts suggests that less has
changed than might have appeared from the massive legal reforms of
the last two decades. At a fundamental level, the resistance to battered womens' claims evidences society's continued unwillingness to
believe that "normal" healthy human beings can be, without their own
complicity, so frequently and so severely victimized and traumatized
by men who appear "normal."'" It is easier to believe that these
women are sick, strange, or malevolent enough to fabricate extensive
false allegations of violence by men. Alternatively, it appears to be
preferable to blame the victim for having "put up with it" on the
incorrect assumption that she could have ended the abuse by leaving. 2 Either form of denial is far easier than acceptance of the reality that so many men are so dangerous, and that there is little (or

nothing) many women can do on their own to be safe. At root, acceptance of this terrible reality would necessitate recognition that male
domination over women is culturally conditioned and condoned; that
gender injustice is real, present, and dire.

EN KILL 112-13 (1987). Some studies suggest that men who litigate for custody receive it
more than half of the time. Mahoney, supra note 9, at 44-45.
51. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
52. The question "why didn't she leave" underlies virtually all ambivalence about claims
of abuse. The question itself is based on two fallacies: the idea that battered women don't
leave; and the idea that "leaving" ends the violence. In fact, the vast majority of battered
women do leave at some point; their departure is often the trigger for worse violence. See
Mahoney, supra note 9, at 6. Since battering is primarily a means of exercising power and
control over the victim, serious abusers do not allow their victims to simply walk away.
Thus, my client's abuser attempted to stab her to death (breaking into her home in the middle of the night) after she evicted him from the apartment; subsequently, pending trial, he
stalked her and repeatedly threatened to kill her and the child. He has never been held accountable for any of this behavior, and she and her child remain at risk. Although separated
or divorced women comprise 10% of all women, they report 75% of partner violence. Evan
Stark & Anne E. Flitcraft, Violence Against Intimates: An Epidemiological Review, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VioLENCE 308 (Vincent B. van Hasselt et al. eds., 1988).
Moreover, studies consistently indicate that approximately fifty percent of homeless
women with children are fleeing domestic violence. Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major
Cause of Homelessness, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421 (Special Issue 1991). In other words,
many women don't have anywhere else to live with their children. Finally, help for battered
women who seek safety is rarely forthcoming, from official or unofficial sources. See EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SuRvivoRs: AN ALTERNATIVE TO

TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988) (more than 70% of women studied had left home
at some time in response to violence; substantial numbers sought help of various kinds,
which help was not forthcoming); Dutton, supra note 4, at 1227 ("[b]attered women utilize
an impressive array of strategies for attempting to stop the violence in some way").
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2. New Social Science Approaches
The pervasiveness of this stubborn resistance to the reality of
victimization of women by violent male partners53 means that it is
critical for social science experts who seek to help battered womens'
stories be accurately heard in court, to address their analyses to the
real social context which makes repeated battering possible. In the
specific case, this means that such analyses must counter the
factfinder's inclinations to believe that (1) the battered woman is
anything other than "normal," and (2) the battered woman is responsible for the continuation of the abuse. The following briefly describes
three relatively new approaches which begin to offer assistance along
these lines. Although no one approach is necessarily applicable or
sufficient in any given case, aspects of each may be helpful to consider.
a.

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") was first conceived to
explain the long-term impact on war veterans of being exposed in
combat to traumatic events "outside the range of usual human experience."'54 Of the three essential symptoms of PTSD, "hyperarousal" s
refers to the survivor's state of "constant alert" for danger, which
may take the form of excessive irritability and explosive aggression.
"Intrusion" describes the reliving of the horror of the original violence through flashbacks and nightmares. 6 And "constriction" refers
to the phenomena of "dissociation," "trance," or "numbness" which is
a natural human response to massive terror. The protective numb or
detached state may continue after the original event to protect against
experiencing the horrific memory.57 All three symptoms have been
found to be common among battered women."

53. Intimate violence also occurs in homosexual relationships. As Mary Ann Dutton
notes, "while a gender analysis of power is necessary, it is not sufficient to understand the
dynamics of violence and abuse in all intimate relationships." Dutton, supra note 4, at 1211.
54. HERMAN, supra note 23, at 33.

55. Id. at 35-36.
56. Id. at 37-42.
57. Id. at 42-47.
58. Id. at 28-32. Lenore Walker now defines battered woman syndrome in terms of
PTSD. See Lenore Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321 (1992). Judith Herman actually argues that survivors of prolonged
abuse experience a more extreme form of PTSD, which she proposes to call "complex posttraumatic stress disorder." HERMAN, supra note 23, at 119. Another name being considered
by various professional entities is "disorder of extreme stress not otherwise specified"
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If an individual battered woman suffers from PTSD, that infor-

mation can be quite helpful in the litigation context, in two respects.59 First, the symptoms of hyperarousal, intrusion and constric-

tion may profoundly affect the woman's demeanor and interaction
with people and events, and thereby her credibility, in the eyes of observers. For instance, "dissociation" may cause her to be numb when
describing her abuse, thereby appearing "plastic" or "fake."

"Hyperarousal" may cause her to be extremely excitable in response
to a minor incident, such as an insult from her abuser.' Outbursts of
anger to the abuser or others, behavior which frequently destroys
battered woman syndrome defenses, 6 may also be partly explainable
by PTSD.62 In my custody case described above, my client's seemingly "plastic" affect, her inappropriate giggling, and her racing
speech, all consistently provoked observers to see her as "weird,"

"crazy" or insincere. Thus, Dr. Stark's testimony about PTSD was
helpful in offering the judge an alternative interpretation of her demeanor on the stand, as well as her demeanor in the psychiatric inter-

view, which had resulted in the "diagnosis" of various forms of character disorder.' Since this case, like most battered womens' cases,
was cast as a credibility battle, this expert testimony which directly
related to credibility was potentially key.'
Second, the concept of PTSD is an improvement over battered
woman syndrome in that it shifts the focus away from the "personali-

("DESNOS"). Id. For purposes of this Article I continue to refer to "PTSD" to include both
the "ordinary" and "complex" forms.
59. See Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Among
Battered Women: Analysis of Legal Implications, BEHAVIORAL SCt. & L. (in press).
60. Such behavior by her abuser may "trigger" the woman's memory of severe violence
or terror inflicted in a barrage of similar insults.
61. See, e.g., Stark. supra note 19, at 281, 285.
62. HERMAN, supra note 23, at 120 (alternation between extreme passivity and outbursts
of rage is one profile of survivor of prolonged, repeated trauma).
63. Moreover, Dr. Stark also pointed out how some of the child's conduct, i.e., re-enacting the stabbing of her mother, was also understandable as a form of PTSD.
64. See Maguigan, supra note 28, at 439-40 (some self-defense cases are erroneously
adjudicated at the outset by judge's refusal to allow a self-defense instruction to the jury, on
grounds defendant's evidence of self-defense is insufficiently credible). Judith Herman emphasizes that "[t]he study of psychological trauma must constantly contend with this tendency to
discredit the victim or to render her invisible. Throughout the history of the field, dispute has
raged over whether patients with post-traumatic conditions are entitled to care or respect or
are deserving of contempt, whether they are genuinely suffering or malingering, whether their
histories are true or false, and, if false, whether imagined or maliciously fabricated. . . . It is
not only patients but also the investigators of post-traumatic conditions whose credibility is
repeatedly challenged." HERMAN, supra note 23, at 8-9.
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ty" or "character" of the battered woman, and describes her behaviors

as a natural human response to trauma imposed from external sources.
Application of PTSD to domestic violence also makes explicit the

profound "trauma" which battered women or abused children suffer. It
is difficult, while not impossible, to hold a victim of "trauma" legally
responsible for the effects of the trauma.' Even if a woman's
parenting has in fact been negatively affected, once she is characterized as a "trauma victim," it becomes clear that she (and her child)

should be assisted in recovering, not penalized by being separated."
However, PTSD also has liabilities. First, if an individual experiences some but not all of the criteria for PTSD, the diagnosis cannot
be made. To the extent that PTSD has been defined as simply anoth-

er form of "battered woman syndrome," if the full diagnosis cannot
be made, it may appear that the woman does not "fit" the syndrome,
with all of the associated negative consequences.67 Moreover, PTSD
still treats the battering victim as suffering from a "clinical" condition
and "disorder." As such, the diagnosis may still be used against bat-

tered women in a custody or neglect/abuse context, although presumably less so than the battered woman syndrome.
b.

"Revised Battered Woman Syndrome"

In light of progress in the social science understandings of domestic violence since the battered woman syndrome was first conceptualized and then reformulated, Mary Ann Duttone has developed a
much expanded "redefinition" of the battered woman syndrome. This

redefinition offers a conceptual framework which experts can use to

65. "PTSD . . . removes responsibility from the victim for his or her victimization and
frees clinicians to encourage the refraining and reclaiming of personal histories marred by
tyranny and exploitation." S.M. Rose et al., Responding to Hidden Abuse: A Role for Social
Work in Reforming Mental Health Systems, 36 SoC. WoRK 408-13 (1991).
66. Of course, if the child's welfare were in jeopardy as a result of her mother's PTSD,
removal could be appropriate (but not to the batterer). Presumably, assisting the mother in
reducing the destructive impact of the PTSD would be better for child and mother, however.
67. Although Lenore Walker currently uses PTSD as her definition of the battered woman syndrome, see supra note 58, it is not necessary to so define it. An expert could presumably present evidence about PTSD and state.that the victim exhibited some of the symptoms,
regardless of whether a full diagnosis can be made or not. For instance, in my custody case,
PTSD was described and posited, but not diagnosed. See Dutton, supra note 4. at 1199-1200,
1221-26.
68. Clinical psychologist, and collaborator in the Domestic Violence Advocacy Project
described in the rest of this Article. See infra note 97.
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examine cases in which intimate violence is an issue.69 The model
responds to two perceived limitations of the "battered woman syndrome" currently in use. First, it seeks to make explicit the need to
expand the focus beyond the woman's psychology, to include more
contextually the pattern and nature of the violence and abuse, including patterns of dominance and control; the woman's strategies and
responses to her abuser's violence, and the outcomes of those strategies; and other contextual dimensions within which she coped with
the abuse. 0 Secondly, the model is structured so as not to define
any single set of characteristics or profile of a "battered woman" or
battering experience. Dr. Dutton seeks quite explicitly to provide a
way of analyzing individual cases which can do justice to each case
but does not require a case to fit a particular profile in order to shed
light on the woman's actions."
Specifically, the model calls for expert witnesses to examine
"four key components" of the battered woman's experience in any
given case: (1) the cumulative history of violence and abuse, including the scope and severity (e.g., attacks on children) or "pattern" of
psychological terror and control which many victims endure;72 (2)
the battered woman's psychological responses to violence, including
"psychological distress or dysfunction, cognitive reactions, and relational disturbances;"'73 (3) the strategies used (and not used) by the
battered woman for responding to violence and abuse, and their consequences, including attempts to escape, to placate, to get help for the
abuser, to seek alternative living places, physical self-defense, legal
action, calling the police, etc;74 and (4) the intervening factors which
influenced her strategies for responding and psychological reactions,
such as fear of retaliation, economic resources, children, sources of
social support, etc.75
Dutton's formulation is helpful in a number of respects. First, as
noted, rather than defining the "battered woman" or a particular set of
responses to battering, it calls for evaluation of every case in a comprehensive manner, but one which is framed by the issues in the legal
case. Thus "learned helplessness" may apply in some cases, but it

69.
70.
71.
72.

Dutton, supra note 4, at 1194.
Id. at 1231-32.
Id. at 1196-97.
Id. at 1202-15.

73. Id. at 1226-31.
74. Id. at 1218-26.
75. Id. at 1231-40.
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need not be present in order for the expert's evaluation to be relevant. If elements of PTSD are present but the full diagnosis is not
met, the expert assessment can so state.76 If the abuser only utilized
severe violence once or twice, but engaged in other psychologically
abusive or controlling behaviors throughout the year, the expert can
describe the "state of siege" that existed while no overt violence was
occurring.77 In short, cases that do not fit the stereotype (as most do
not) can still benefit from the expert assessment.
Second, Dutton's construct clearly invites attention to the context
within which the battered woman experienced the abuse. Rather than
just considering the woman's psychological response to particular
incidents of violence, the assessment includes her entire social context, including her efforts to seek help or escape, the existence of
children, the batterer's threats to kill or remove the children, the
responses of others, economic factors, etc. For instance, if, as in my
case, the battered woman had repeatedly sought criminal prosecution
and the courts had repeatedly failed to prosecute, this fact, and the
fact that non-prosecution of domestic violence is a common phenomenon which does not negate the reality of the violence, could also be
addressed. Thus, while based on a "scientific" assessment of the
woman and the relevant literature, Dutton's model is not a purely
"medical" model of a "disorder" which exists in a vacuum. The reasons for the battered woman's choices, perceptions, and behaviors can
be fully explored, and those reasons need not mimic any particular
syndrome or pattern. This flexibility may offer the clarity and accuracy which the battered woman syndrome has sometimes obscured, and
should reduce the likelihood of "blaming the victim" by neglecting to
portray her reality and the context within which she lived.
The redefined battered woman syndrome model may also have
limitations. First, precisely because it does not articulate a particular
theory or concept by which to understand or assess the imrpact of
battering on a woman litigant, it offers less guidance for experts and
counsel, and for juries. With sophisticated counsel and experts, this
may not be a problem; with others it may be. Second, because it still
contemplates ample emphasis on individual psychology, including
childhood history or other experiences, the same risks could attend it
as have attended battered woman syndrome: judges, prosecutors and
juries may not find a woman's psychological responses "reasonable"

76.
77.

Id. at 1222-23.
Id. at 1208.
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for purposes of self-defense, merely because they were understandable
in light of her past experiences.7 8 Third, especially in custody cases,
the model's focus on the woman's response to battering, as opposed
to the abuser's motives and the impact on the children, may again

lead to "blaming the victim" rather than focusing on the perpetrator
of the violence."' Nonetheless, overall, because the framework expressly contemplates inclusion of the larger context in expert analyses,
it invites as fair as possible a portrayal of the battered woman's experience.

c.

Entrapment or Coercive Control

In the last few years, there has been a growing emphasis in the
literature and community on understanding battering not as violence,
per se, but rather, as a larger pattern of dominance and control.'

The focus on power and control is arguably critical for a number of
reasons. First, it can help to recast the omnipresent question, "why
did she stay?""t As Martha Mahoney points out, portrayal of the
78. See, e.g., id. at 1220 (describing relevance of woman's childhood experience of
futility of calling the police for beatings of her mother, as relevant to her adult perception of
the existence of alternatives to killing abuser). Most jurisdictions utilize a mixed "subjective"
and "objective" reasonableness test for self-defense, whereby the defendant's decision that she
needed to kill to defend herself must be a reasonable one for a person with her experience
and perceptions. Maguigan, supra note 28, at 379 & n.105. Although this may incorporate a
defendant's experiences or perceptions from her past, it seems unlikely that prosecutors, judges and juries will be prepared to let battered womens' personal psychology negate culpability,
particularly when that psychology is judged to be different than that of a "healthy" or "normar' woman. Indeed, consideration of childhood or other experiences in explaining a
defendant's assumptions about available options, etc., comes perilously close to the theory that
adults who had painful childhoods should not be held criminally culpable for crimes they
commit.
79. Although the model is presented as applying to all kinds of cases, it is clearly
driven by Dr. Dutton's experience in homicide cases where the battered woman defendant's
state of mind is the critical legal and factual issue.
80. SUSAN SCHECHTER & ANN JONES, WHEN LOVE GOES WRONG 13-14, 29 (1992)
(discussing "coercive control" of abusers)- Mahoney, supra note 9, at 53-71; Schneider, supra
note 29, at 537-38; Stark, supra note 19, at 282-83. The emphasis on power and control is
not new: The Dobashs' analysis of the patriarchal roots of wife-beating is a classic expression
of the same thing. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 11, passim. Strong domestic violence programs, such as the Duluth Abuse Intervention Project, have always stressed "power and control" in their models for batterers' counseling, and advocates' programs around the country
use the "Power and Control" wheel, to educate victims to the dynamic operating in their
relationship. See ELLEN PENCE & MIcHAEL PAYMAR, POWER AND CONTROL: TACTIcs OF
MEN WHO BATTER (1986), cited in Mahoney, supra note 9, at 34. Mary Ann Dutton. in the
"redefined battered woman syndrome" includes assessment of "power and control" tactics as
part of the expert's assessment of the nature and severity of the abuse. Id. at 1206.
81. Mary Ann Dutton's "redefined battered woman syndrome" similarly seeks to replace
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abuser's exercise of power and control over the woman implicitly
shifts the attention away from her psychology to his motivations for
his violence."2 When it is clear that his violence, and everything else
he does to her, is directed at controlling and possessing her, it is
harder to blame her for what she did or didn't do. Moreover, understanding the pattern of control makes it easier to understand how she
"didn't leave" during the time when he "wasn't violent." Second, as

Evan Stark points out, focusing on power and control can counter the
tendency of the courts to focus on specifiable incidents of physical
violence (usually meaning injury), which often trivializes the severity
of abuse relationships in which little or no physical injury occurs, yet
the abuse is profound, severe, and extensive. 3 Finally, the abuser's
need for power and control may bring to the surface a dynamic

which is common in these cases in court, but rarely identified: the
courts' intimidation by batterers and the framing of compliant responses so as to avoid provoking his rage and possible violence."
Evan Stark, a sociologist and social worker, has coined the term
"entrapment" to best summarize the experience of battered women. In
his words,
[w]hat creates a battered woman is neither violence per se nor the
psychological status of either party, but the mix of social and psychological factors that make it seemingly impossible for the victim
to escape or to effectively protect herself from abuse-what we

"why did she stay?" with "what did she do to stop the violence?" PENcE; & PAYMAR, supra
note 80, at 1226-27.
82. Mahoney, supra note 9, at 57. Thus, Martha Mahoney urges recognition of "separation assault" as a term to describe the extraordinarily common violence aimed at preventing a
woman's departure. Naming this violence "separation assault" makes the motivation explicit,
replacing the previous assumptions that battered women only get assaulted as a function of
conflict in their relationship. Anecdotal evidence suggests that women get beaten for assertive
behavior and resistance to control. Id. at 29 (citing LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN at xi (1979)).
83. Stark, supra note 19, at 279-82 (describing case of woman assaulted "several hundred times" and threatened with a gun over several years, but who only saw a doctor once
for a sprained finger).
84. In my experience, many court personnel, including judges and social workers appear
to bend over backwards to placate batterers, and are careful to give them respect and positive
reinforcement. This is quite different from their treatment of the women whose expressions of
anger frequently lose them the case. There appears to be a strong dynamic in the courtroom
against denying a belligerent abuser what he wants. Expert testimony about this dynamic may
not only help a judge recognize his instinct toward placating an abuser, but also offers the
best possible explanation of what the battered woman did or did not do: i.e., everything she
did was an effort to minimize danger to self and children.
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have termed "entrapment."'
Stark and others point out that the batterer engages in a pattern of
control that "extends structural inequalities in rights and opportunities
to virtually every aspect of a woman's life," such as food, money,
friendships, personal appearance, relationships with children, extended
family, etc.' The control exercised by the batterer and his violence
is strengthened by the failure of external,- social sources of help to
intervene or provide any assistance, e.g., when police fail to arrest,
doctors fail to inquire about abuse, and child protective services remove a child from her mother rather than help make mother and
child safe. 7 For use in court by an expert, Stark suggests a checklist
of factors identified by Angela Browne and others, charting the nature
and severity of the violence, intimidation, coercion, isolation, threats,
and other means of control. 88
Whether an expert relies on the specific factors Stark suggests,
or expands the framework, the "coercive control" theory provides a
coherent framework for a psychosocial assessment of a battered
woman's experiences in connection with a legal case. First, the theory
seems to enhance the search for justice for battered women by focusing on the batterer's power and control, and on society's collusion
with the batterer in leaving his victim to her fate. Rather than relying
primarily on the woman's psychological responses, it focuses on the
more objective parameters describing the batterer's behavior. In so
doing, it invites a wider range of social science expertise than the
traditional psychological expert.89 Second, the "entrapment" construct
85. Stark, supra note 19, at 290.
86. Id. at 282; see also SCHECTER & JONES. supra note 80, at 17-22.
87. Stark. supra note 19, at 283; see also GORDON, supra note 12, at 285 ("One assault
does not make a battered woman; she becomes that because of her socially determined inability to resist or escape.").
88. Stark, supra note 19, at 290 (listing serial assault, weapons, threats to kill, sexual
assault, assaults on children, among others). Mahoney's "separation assault" would seem to be
an obvious item for inclusion in this assessment. Stark also emphasizes Charles Ewing's
theory of "psychological self-defense" as a basis for a self-defense claim which flows from
the "entrapment" construct. In essence, psychological self-defense refers to the battered
woman's killing to end her constant state of terror and dread, the "state of siege" described
by Sue Osthoff and Mary Ann Dutton. CHARLES EwtNG, BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL
(1987); Dutton, supra note 4, at 1208. Women who kill, not because they knew they would
die that night, but because they knew that if not then, they would die soon thereafter at their
batterer's hands, usually cannot avail themselves of traditional self-defense. Yet when one
hears their stories of "entrapment," or captivity, it seems they had little choice. See cases
cited infra note 90. The appropriateness and viability of such a defense is, however, beyond
the scope of this Article.
89. This may be the primary difference between Stark's "entrapment" theory and
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can help crystallize clearly how some battered women endure effectively forced captivity and hostage conditions.' ° This theory also
counters the notion that if the woman hit the man she could not have
been in need of self-defense; 9' it demonstrates that the "hits" per se
are not the issue; it is the context of power and control (and terror)
that counts. Finally, because the theory starts from a position of consciousness about gender inequality, it assists the factfinder in seeing
that her assumptions about "reasonableness" should start from a position of gender equality: since the abuser allows no such equality, it is
easier to identify the victimization from the start.
The entrapment theory's greatest strengths may be its greatest
weaknesses: First, insofar as it takes an affirmative position about
"justice" and injustice, it sounds more like advocacy and less like science. The theory's helpful emphases on the batterer's motivation and
behavior, the childrens' needs, and the social context of non-assistance or condoning the abuse, within which the battered woman's
responses to the abuse are put in perspective, can also open the testimony up to attack. Unlike the Dutton model, which retains the paradigm of an expert psychological assessment of the battered woman,
this model relies to a large extent on assertions about the psychology
of the batterer and children, not necessarily base on interviews with
them.' Such testimony may be seen as inadequately "scientific,"
arguably invading the jury's province of judging credibility and finding the facts. However, to date admissibility does not appear to have

Dutton's "redefined battered woman syndrome" model. Dutton emphasizes the importance of
an individual assessment of the battered woman. Dutton, supra note 4, at 1202. Stark's theory contemplates non-psychological experts speaking in some depth about behaviors and motivations of individuals they have not interviewed, i.e., batterers (and sometimes children).

However, although they are described very differently, the differences are apt to shrink in
practice, as under both approaches, experts would analyze psychological conditions as well as
external and social impacts and constraints.
90. Women who kill their abusers often live through incredibly harrowing tales of being
tracked down like animals and forcibly returned to captivity, or threatened with having the
rest of their family killed, etc., if they don't return. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572
(Kan. 1988) (holding that defendant had no right to a jury instruction on self-defense because
she shot her husband while he was asleep, after being tracked down, once again severely
abused and threatened, and defendant's thoughts of "kill or be killed"); see also State v.
Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (similar).
91. While some studies have appeared to show equal numbers of violent acts by male
and female partners, without distinguishing between acts of aggression and of self-defense,
numerous studies show 95% of assaults are by males against females. There is in any event
little dispute regarding who inflicts the serious violence and injuries. See Frieze & Browne,
supra note 24, at 182-83.
92. See supra note 89.
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been a problem; this kind of critique is most likely to arise in crossexamination.93
A second possible limitation of the entrapment theory is the risk
that a simplistic use of it could backfire. As with the "battered woman syndrome," to the extent that this theory offers a specific construct
and rationale for battering, it may be capable of being used against
some women whose stories do not fit the model perfectly. Over-emphasis on "entrapment" might in some cases be used to argue the
woman was not trapped (and therefore is responsible for the continuation of the violence). In practice, Stark's use of the theory is more
subtle, typically emphasizing coercion and control, and not necessarily
"entrapment" per se.' So long as the expert focuses on the ways the
abuser constrained and coerced his victim, it will serve the purpose of
keeping attention on the perpetrator, reducing courts' tendencies toward victim-blaming.
In sum, expert testimony and social science theories have increasingly been utilized to counter some of the stereotypes, myths,
and assumptions which have made it impossible for battered women
to receive a fair hearing in many kinds of cases. At root, these theories have sought to educate the courts and public about the realities
of battering so that womens' stories may be heard and justly adjudicated. Although the first generation of research has broken ground in
this area, it has also met with resistance from deep-rooted denial of
the victimization experienced by women at the hands of men. Several
of the newer approaches, post-traumatic stress disorder, "redefined"
battered woman syndrome, and "entrapment" or "coercive control"
offer new hope for battered women. By expanding the psychological
approach to explicitly take battered womens' social context into ac-

93. Evan Stark states that his approach has been used successfully in "dozens" of cases
(sometimes under the rubric of "battered woman syndrome"). Telephone Interview with Evan
Stark (Feb. 1994). In State v. Borrelli, Dr. Stark's expert testimony was admitted without
needing to pass the Frye test of "general acceptance in the relevant scientific community"
precisely because it was not so technical and "scientific" as to be incapable of being evaluated by common sense and independent judgment. 227 Conn. 153, 164 (1993). In Borrelli, Dr.
Stark did not examine the defendant but merely provided general testimony about battering.

94. In my custody case (a bench trial), Dr. Stark's testimony was admitted without
objection. Here he did interview the client, and his testimony included a finding that she was
a battered woman. It also emphasized the abuser's need for power and control, the presence
of several severe risk factors, and the risk to the child. Because the issue was visitation and
not homicide, the worst violence had occurred since the parties were separated, and the main
focus was "the best interest of the child," the concept of "entrapment" was not centrally
relevant.
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count, they implicitly demonstrate the unfairness of victim-blaming
and the assumptions of male prerogative which underlie that tendency.
These theories have developed in part as the result of a process of

interaction between the social sciences and law whereby each informs
the other. This process of collaboration has been beneficial both to
society's understanding of battering and to the goal of achieving
justice for battered women, and should continue.
The integration of legal and psychosocial perspectives on domes-

tic violence is valuable, not only in the realm of theory, but also in
practice. In particular, collaboration between lawyers and psychologists in cases on behalf of battered women has been fruitful in developing the kinds of substantive theories described above.95 However,
such collaboration in the actual lawyering process in battered

womens' cases is far more rare. The remainder of this Article discusses such collaboration in the clinical teaching context.
ll. PRACTICE-THE VALUE OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
TO TEACHING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGAL CLINIC

In light of the extensive integration of psychology into the substantive law and procedures governing legal cases concerning domestic violence, it seems clear that an interdisciplinary approach to
teaching about domestic violence in a legal clinic makes sense."

95. A high percentage of social science researchers and clinicians in the field of domestic violence, e.g., Lenore Walker, Mary Ann Dutton, and Evan Stark. consult with attorneys
and work as expert witnesses on cases. To some extent, this experience has helped to shape
their understandings of how battered womens' experiences are resisted and distorted in the
courts. The opportunity for interdisciplinary cross-fertilization has been enhanced by two conferences in the last two years sponsored by the American Bar Association Criminal Justice
Section on "Defending Battered Women in Criminal Cases," each of which was well-attended
and included presenters from both social science and legal professions.
96. See Merryman, supra note 7, at 393 (interdisciplinary approach inherent in teaching
domestic violence). The benefit of explicitly interdisciplinary approaches to law has long been
debated. Most recently, Judge Edwards of the U.S. Court of.Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
lambasted the recent trend toward interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching, as reflecting a
disdain for legal practice and an overly theoretical approach to law. Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MiCH. L. REV.

34 (1992). Regardless of the merits of his critique, which provoked a flurry of opposing
articles (see Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REv. (1993)), I believe the approach
advocated herein would be applauded by Judge Edwards in any event. First, as has been
pointed out by Barbara Woodhouse in describing her innovative family law course, it is
precisely through an interdisciplinary approach to the field, with use of "clinical" simulations,
that students can learn the most about ethical, creative lawyering. See Woodhouse, supra note
1, at 1981-93. Secondly, family law has long been seen as an appropriate subject for interdisciplinary collaboration, both because psychological understanding is integrally connected to the
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Toward that end, I have sought to integrate a psychological viewpoint
and materials into the domestic violence legal clinic I teach at George

Washington University National Law Center. In my first year of
teaching this clinic, that integration has been implemented through
collaborative teaching with Mary Ann Dutton, a well-known clinical
psychologist who specializes in domestic violence, particularly as an
expert witness in legal cases.97

Drawing upon my experiences in this clinic, as well as some
additional-but as yet untried-teaching ideas, the discussion below
reflects my thoughts on the value of an interdisciplinary approach in
this field, and offers one model for an interdisciplinary approach to a

clinical course on domestic violence." While I do not claim that this

applicable legal standards, and because of the obvious need for psychological skill in lawyers
dealing with children or emotionally charged parties. See Noel Zaal, Family Law Teaching in
the No-Fault Era: A Pedagogic Proposal, 35 J. LEGAL EDuc. 552 (1985). A significant
proportion of law school interdisciplinary programs concern family law. As just one example,
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln boasts an interdisciplinary "Center on Children, Families
and the Law," which, among other things, oversees seven joint degree programs in
"psycholegal studies."
97. See discussion supra part II.B.2.b for discussion of Dr. Dutton's proposed "redefined
battered woman syndrome." see Dutton, supra note 4. In addition to her extensive record of
publication and expert testimony, Dr. Dutton founded and directed for fourteen years a Family Violence Clinic at Nova University, in which clinical psychology graduate students received live-client training and supervision as part of their degree program.
98. This model differs from others in two respects. First, it entails greater actual collaboration than most interdisciplinary programs, where actual co-teaching by different professionals is rare. More often law school "interdisciplinary" teaching takes the form of joint degree
programs and mixing of professional students in courses taught by one professional. See, e.g.,
Ken Myers, Help for Children, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 4, 1993, at 4 (describing new three-year
course of study at Loyola-Chicago). Many interdisciplinary clinics utilize a variety of models
of interdisciplinary work in, e.g., disability law, housing law, immigration law, and juvenile
law, but do not typically include ongoing joint teaching and supervision. See, e.g., Jean K.
Peters, NEWSLETTER, AALS SECTION ON CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, Dec. 1993, at 17 (on
file with author) (describing Yale Law School interdisciplinary clinics). Second, the DVAP
model involves a lesser collaboration than at least one other model of co-teaching established
in the Family Law course which was collaboratively taught by a psychoanalyst (Joseph
Goldstein) and law professor (Jay Katz) at Yale Law School in the 1950s-60s. Each class
session consisted of a debate between the two professionals as a lead-in to discussion; the
co-teachers constantly locked horns about various theoretical issues in the field. The rewards
and difficulties of this highly engaged collaboration are discussed in a moving and revealing
essay by Joseph Goldstein, The Silent World of Collaboratorsfrom Different Disciplines, 16
L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 248 (1988). This kind of intensive engagement goes beyond what
Dr. Dutton and I could contemplate. Among other things, in a live-client legal clinic, the
commitment must be to training students to act competently as lawyers, and the teaching of
psychology must be subordinated to that goal. Moreover, Dr. Dutton's position at the law
school was limited to one day per week, whereas teaching the clinic constitutes my full-time
job.
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model is ideal' or fully successful, I believe it suggests ways to
incorporate the contributions of psychology into the legal teaching of
domestic violence, both with and without the assistance of a social
science expert as a co-teacher.
After providing an overview of the DVAP and Dr. Dutton's coteaching role, I discuss the potential contribution of the interdisciplinary approach to both students' substantive advocacy on behalf of their
clients and to their lawyering skills outside the courtroom. Social
science knowledge can strengthen students' legal arguments and advocacy; working with an actual psychologist can teach them how to
both use and challenge expert witnesses or evaluators in domestic
violence cases. More fundamentally, outside the courtroom, some
basic psychological knowledge can enhance students' interviewing and
counseling skills, and their formulation of an appropriate definition of
their role as lawyer. Particularly in domestic violence cases, psychosocial understanding about domestic violence can be critical to
students' ability to develop a meaningful lawyer-client relationship
and effectively counsel their clients. I focus specifically on three
aspects of working with battered women which can be difficult for
lawyers: identifying and addressing clients' ambivalence about legal
action, which may not be clearly stated; identifying and assessing the
degree of danger and the risks or benefits of taking legal or other
action; and dealing with the often strong emotional responses to domestic violence cases for all players, including attorneys, judges, and
other professional personnel. Understanding "counter-transference" can
help students learn to recognize their own and others' personal reactions which inhibit professional responses to their cases, and to interpret and manage these reactions. Finally, I discuss some of the challenges and limitations of the interdisciplinary approach to teaching a
domestic violence clinic.

99.

Martha Fineman has powerfully critiqued the legal system's over-reliance on social
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION
OF EQUALITY 149 (1991); Fineman, supra note 22. Fineman views family courts' reliance on
psychological experts as an abdication of legal decisionmaking which, in the name of gender
equality and "therapeutic" process, masks a dramatic shift in substantive rights to benefit men
and hurt women and children. As supra part II illustrates, I share her critique of the
distortive potential of psychology in the legal context; I also agree that courts too often treat
family cases as implicating emotions and not rights, and place excess reliance on non-legal
evaluators, all of which often work to the detriment of women and children. However, as I
hope this Article demonstrates, it is possible for the legal profession to work with the social
science professions in a way which enhances lawyers' and courts' understanding and protection of women and children in violent families.

sciences rather than legal rights, in family law cases. See
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A.

Overview of the Domestic Violence Advocacy Project

1. In General
The Domestic Violence Advocacy Project is a full-year clinical
program emphasizing lawyering for social change with particular
focus on the problem of domestic violence. Eight to 10 students take
the clinic for 4 credits. Students attend a weekly two-hour seminar, in
addition to devoting 14-18 hours per week to their clinical work.
For the bulk of their clinical work, students represent battered
women in court cases seeking civil protection orders ("CPO's") and
seeking their enforcement through contempt proceedings. These cases,
which are expedited by the court, give students superb experience in
representing individual clients, including interviewing and counseling,
legal problem-solving, and trial skills. In addition, in the DVAP's first
year, two students have assisted the public defender service in an
ongoing homicide case brought against a battered woman who killed
her batterer.I°°
In addition to the casework, most students 0 ' are also required
to participate in an ongoing larger project seeking to reform the justice system's response to domestic violence. In its first year, the
clinic's primary reform project involves a study of the use of expert
testimony on battering for self-defense claims in criminal cases in the
D.C. court system. Students will survey homicide cases in which
battered women killed their batterers, in order to make recommendations to the legislature concerning the appropriateness of proposed
amendments concerning admissibility of expert testimony. In addition,
those students who are not working actively on the study are required
to participate in one other non-litigation project to improve the
system's response to battered women. These projects were formulated
directly from our experiences with systemic problems arising in clinic
cases.' Students' project work also includes participation with other

100. In light of the expressions of interest from other Public Defender Offices in the
region, our long-term plan is to develop a regional resource center for criminal defense counsel seeking consultation or assistance in criminal cases brought against battered women in
which domestic violence is relevant to the defense. Such cases might include the classic

homicide case in which the battered woman claims self-defense, or other crimes in which the
defendant claims duress by her abuser.
101. Because the homicide case has proven to be very consuming for the students involved, they were excused from participating in the system reform projects.
102. The projects students chose between included: (1) developing a complete Referral
List of Resources for battered women, including shelters, various kinds of counseling services,
legal services in nearby jurisdictions, batterers' programs, etc; (2) establishing a systematic
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community agencies working on domestic violence through the Domestic Violence Coordinating Council of the D.C. Superior Court.
Through this combination of civil and criminal work for battered
women, students can learn about both sides of the legal system, gain
exposure to both the prosecutorial and defense roles, and gain a richer perspective on the legal system's response to domestic violence.
Moreover, through their simultaneous work on individual cases and
larger system reform issues, it is my hope that students will learn
about lawyers' ability and obligation to both shape the law and work
within it, and about the need for individual representation to inform
broad policies, and vice versa.
The DVAP weekly seminar focuses on the interaction of theory
and practice, teaching about the substantive law, psychology and
sociology of domestic violence, trial skills, and system reform lawyering. Classes involve numerous simulations, roleplays, and discussions
of the dynamics of domestic violence, the lawyering role, and ethical
issues, with frequent reference to the students' (and teachers') ongoing
cases. Classes occasionally utilize socratic dialogue or problem analysis to teach substantive law. Classes also include "Grand Rounds," in
which students share issues from their cases and jointly strategize and
problem-solve, and guest appearances from other community organizations or experts.
2. Psychological Components
In the first semester, 3 the psychological perspective was integrated into the structure and content of the clinic in a number of
different ways, including classes taught by Dr. Dutton, other classes
focusing on psychosocial material, co-supervision, and Dr. Dutton's
independent consultations with students.
Dr. Dutton taught two classes on developing psychosocial perspectives on domestic violence. In the first of these classes, Dr.

method for collecting complaints about police responses to battered womens' calls, including
establishing communication with the police regarding these complaints; and (3) establishing a
system of legal referrals for battered women, including analyzing the current logjam between
shelters, courts, police and other community entities, in connecting up needy clients with pro
bono attorneys.
103. Because funding was not obtained and Dr: Dutton's availability was not confirmed
until after the semester began, her role was initially developed as we went along, and had an
experimental quality. In the second semester, we have been able to apply what we learned
from the first semester, and have been more conscious and confident in defining Dr. Dutton's
participation in the clinic. That participation is limited to the equivalent of one day per week,
however.
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Dutton outlined her new framework for psychological evaluations of
battered women in legal cases."° As noted supra part II, this model
sets out four areas for expert assessment, including the nature of the
violence, the victim's psychological responses, her strategies for coping with violence, and other relevant contextual information. In the
second class, Dr. Dutton described two cases in which she has been
retained as an expert to assess a battered woman in a legal case. She
focused on the profiles of the two women which she developed from
her interviews, emphasizing the psychosocial aspects of who they are,
and how they might be perceived by the jury. In both classes, Dr.
Dutton and I encouraged the students to make connections between
her analyses and the students' ongoing cases. These classes were
intended to sensitize the students to the psychosocial context of their
clients' lives, to enhance the depth of their understanding of their
clients' motivations, choices, and needs, and to develop their capacity
for empathy and the strength of their advocacy for their clients.'
In addition to the two classes she led, Dr. Dutton co-taught the
class on interviewing. As is discussed further infra part MI.C.1, the
psychological perspective was particularly valuable here. She also
participated in most of the other class sessions, lending her own
experiences, insights and questions to class discussions. Her inputs
frequently assisted the class, e.g., in Grand Rounds, in keeping sight
of the clients' perspectives in context of the students' discussions of
legal procedures and issues.
In addition to her classroom contributions, Dr. Dutton also
played a substantial role in student supervision. She and I jointly
supervised the two students working on the criminal self-defense case.
She also independently consulted regularly with all students on their
protection order cases. These consultations have included analysis of
students' taped interviews with new clients, which have provided
valuable material for feedback and learning. The benefits of Dr.
Dutton's supervisory roles are also discussed further below.
Finally, psychosocial perspectives" were also integrated into a
number of other class sessions taught by myself, such as one on the
criminal justice system's response to domestic violence, one on devel-

104. This model is set forth in full in Dutton, supra note 4, and is summarized at supra
part II.B.2.b.
105. See infra part III.D.1 (regarding need to socialize law students into seeing psycho-

logical material and approach as part of their lawyering role).
106. By this I mean that psychological, sociological, or other non-legal readings were
assigned and the issues raised were discussed in class.
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oping the "theory of the case," and one on custody and domestic
violence.
In the discussion that follows, I focus only on the particular
aspects of our interdisciplinary collaboration and approach which I
believe illustrate the central benefits of integrating psychology into a
domestic violence legal clinic.
B. Teaching Students Effective Advocacy: Psychological
Contributions to Legal Arguments in Domestic Violence Cases
1. Strengthening Development of Case Theory
As is described supra part II, psychology and the social sciences
have contributed substantially to the development of legal theories and
claims in cases where domestic violence is an issue. An understanding of social science research is frequently helpful to advocacy on
behalf of battered women."° On a basic level, even without the use
of expert witnesses, understanding why a battered woman may not be
able to achieve safety by separating from the batterer,"° may help a
lawyer explain to the court why the woman's continuation of a relationship with her abuser does not negate her need for legal protection.
Understanding what the studies show about the danger which batterers
pose to children"9 may help the lawyer argue for supervised rather
than unsupervised visitation.
Substantive knowledge about the psychological impact of posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") can also be crucial to a lawyer's
understanding and advocacy on behalf of a severely battered woman.
As noted earlier, survivors of violent trauma may be "triggered" by
speaking about past events or by other events, even trivial ones,
which may evoke the past traumas. If a client is, e.g., strangely numb
when speaking of violence, or highly emotional when speaking of
relatively minor matters, the lawyer may be helped in coping with her
client by recognizing the signs of PTSD. PTSD may be triggered by
merely being in court for a case, let alone testifying about the traumatic events."' As in my custody case described supra part II.B.2.a,

107. See Dutton, supra note 4; Dutton & Goodman, supra note 59, passim (discussing
use of port-traumatic stress disorder in battered women's legal cases).
108. See supra note 52.
109. See supra note 41.
110. This appeared to be the case in one or more cases I have worked on. Apparently
the experience of the distant and impersonal powerful male authority of a courtroom can be
reminiscent on an emotional level of the experience of being helpless and physically over-
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the client's credibility may be undermined by her "strange" or unconvincing demeanor. Evidence and understanding of PTSD may help the
court interpret the client's demeanor as traumatized, rather than flippant, fake, or hysterical."'
In the DVAP, the students received some general background in
these matters (as described above), but, with the exception of the selfdefense case, none of the CPO cases required use of an expert witness or social science research."' As a result, our treatment of these
materials was somewhat limited. The teaching of psychosocial material could hypothetically extend well beyond the classes we devoted in
the DVAP solely to these issues. For instance, separate classes could
focus on traditional and evolving concepts of the battered woman
syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder in battered women and their
children, the psychology of batterers, or the impact of domestic violence on children. Classes could also be devoted to the role of social
science knowledge in particular types of cases, e.g., custody battles,
neglect or abuse cases, homicide cases, or tort cases. At a more sophisticated level, classes might analyze the strengths and weaknesses
of social science research, conflicts within the field, and ways such
research may be subject to challenge in legal cases."' Such classes
could be taught with or without a social science expert, although they
would undoubtedly by enriched by such participation.
In the clinical setting, two obstacles to teaching this material are
worthy of mention. The first is the common problem of time constraints which can cause trade-offs between the teaching of substance
and skills. In a live-client clinic, the adequacy of the client represen-

powered by a violent exercise of male authority and power. See Dutton, supra note 4. at
1222 n.185.
111. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text (discussing use of PTSD in a variety
of types of domestic violence cases). Such a claim would of course require expert testimony
to at least define PTSD, and ideally, to diagnose the client. In my custody case, Dr. Stark
suggested the possibility that the client and child suffered from PTSD, but did not attempt to
"diagnose" them.
112. These cases are relatively informal and expedited, designed for pro se litigants.
Moreover, the indigent clients and clinical setting mean that funds to retain experts are not
commonly available for the bulk of the clinic's caseload. In my custody case described
above, however, the case was co-counseled with a large law firm, Crowell & Moring, which
itself funded the hiring of an expert.
113. See Goldstein, supra note 98, at 250 (emphasizing the importance of having family
law students engage in critical analysis of both the relevance and the reliability of such materials); Zaal, supra note I, at 564 (describing the "second stage" of an ideal three-stage family
law program as focusing on the contributions of other disciplines, learning to do social science research, and to analyze and critique such materials).
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tation must be the priority. Thus, substantive or theoretical material
which is not always directly applicable to individual casework, is
sometimes sacrificed in favor of the teaching of lawyering skills
which students unquestionably need to minimally represent their clients. This problem may be solvable to some extent,"4 but most
live-client clinics cannot be expected to teach as much of this kind of
material as a non-clinical seminar.
The second difficulty is more centrally related to the teaching of
interdisciplinary material in a law school: It is the challenge of teaching students to make use of the social science materials in their lawyering work. Our experience in the DVAP's first year was that students did not naturally apply these materials to their legal cases. This
was true for more than one team, even where they were urged to
make the connection between materials on domestic violence and
custody/visitation, and their requests for limited or no visitation in
their cases. This and other forms of resistance by law students to
incorporating social science materials into their casework, are discussed further infra part III.D.1.
2. Learning to Work with or Critique Expert Witnesses
Of course, the importance of social science knowledge to domestic violence cases means that expert witnesses can be critical."' Although most civil protection order cases do not warrant expert witnesses," 6 as discussed above, two students in the DVAP have, with
supervision, assisted the Public Defender Service ("PDS") in its representation of a battered woman who killed her batter. The role of the
DVAP in assisting the PDS has been to develop the legal and scientific arguments supporting admission of expert testimony on battering,
and to offer input regarding both the subject-matter of such expert
testimony, and the relevance of domestic violence at various other

114. A common way of reducing time pressure in live-client litigation clinics is to hold
an orientation day, days or week, prior to the beginning of the year, in which fundamental
skills or substance are taught. More full seminars on domestic violence are needed; they
could supplement the clinical experience. See generally Merryman, supra note 7, at 398-99.
115. Depending on how central or controversial the claim being made is, courts will
sometimes permit counsel to make reference to social science knowledge without requiring
testimony of an expert. For example, a lawyer may argue in a closing argument that "studies
show" that batterers do not cease abusing their victims after the parties separate, to support
her claim that the client needs protection. However, where the social science knowledge is
critical to the success of the legal claim and is disputed, expert testimony will normally be

required.
116. See supra note 112.
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stages of the criminal process."7 To this end, the students have conducted extensive research, reviewing traditional legal authorities and
interviewing practitioners around the country, and tapping other resources. t ' They have also been among the first to grapple with the
implications for this field of the Supreme Court's latest decision on
admission of expert testimony."" This area of the law is currently in
transition and offers substantial challenge to students' legal analytical
capabilities, as well as requiring some conversance with relevant
social science research. 20
Dr. Dutton's role on this case has been multi-faceted. As a clini-

cal psychologist with extensive experience as an expert witness in
battered womens' self-defense cases, she has assisted with strategizing

on the case as a whole, making contact with other experts and resources across the country, and alerting students and counsel to the
pitfalls of certain strategies and approaches. As she is not the expert

retained to testify on the case, she has functioned more as a "consultant" than an "expert witness" on the case. At the same time, Dr.
Dutton, along with myself, also acts as a co-supervisor, critiquing

117. Other such uses include the possible use of expert testimony before the Grand Jury,
modification of jury instructions to take account of the domestic violence context, etc. See
Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of
Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WoMENs' RTs. L. REP. 231, 231-38 (1986) (describing uses of
expert testimony at various pre-trial stages of a criminal homicide case).
118. The National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is an invaluable resource for anyone working in the area of battered
womens' self-defense.
119. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (adopting new
test which arguably calls for greater scientific expertise on the part of courts and lawyers).
120. The Daubert decision provides new grist for the academic mill by adopting a rather
amorphous new standard for admissibility of expert testimony, which will necessarily be subject to extensive testing and refining in the lower courts. Daubert instructs federal judges to
assess the "scientific validity" of proffered expert testimony, and suggests, but does not require, application of several "factors" by which to measure such "validity." 113 S. Ct. at
2796-98; see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision: Frye is Dead, Long Live the
Federal Rules of Evidence, TRL, Sept. 1993, at 60, 64 (warning that the purportedly more
"liberal" standard adopted in Daubert may be double-edged).
In addition, changing state laws on the admissibility of expert testimony in domestic
violence cases raise many interesting policy and legal issues. See Maguigan, supra note 28
(reporting results of empirical study of battered womens' self-defense cases and arguing for
caution in adoption of special statutes on the grounds that such statutes often backfire, and
expert testimony is admissible under existing substantive and procedural law). Analysis of
these laws can involve students in in-depth legislative advocacy and policy analysis. The
DVAP's study of local court practice regarding the admission of expert testimony on domestic violence is one example of a project requiring legal, legislative and policy analysis on this
fairly technical issue. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
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written drafts and making suggestions about the students' approach to
and management of their work on the case.
In addition to assisting as a consultant and co-supervisor on a
particular case, a social science expert can assist in teaching all students about other disciplines and working with expert witnesses. One
exercise successfully utilized in the DVAP involved the expert playing herself in class, while students were assigned the roles of counsel
seeking to introduce her testimony, and to cross-examine her. In
particular, the cross-examination can help students acquire a sense of
how one can critique a court-appointed "expert" or an adverse expert
witness. Discussions with the expert herself offered a valuable opportunity to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of a social science
approach "from the horse's mouth." Where an expert is not directly
available as a co-teacher in a clinic, it may be possible to bring in
someone to appear in class, and/or to consult occasionally on casework. To a lesser extent, knowledgeable lawyers can provide some of
the same guidance, perspective, and roleplaying.
C. Teaching the PsychologicalDimensions of Lawyering:
The Intangibles of the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Because the representation of clients involves interaction with
and persuasion of human beings, the psychological dimension of
lawyering is substantial. Some basic understanding of psychological
processes affecting human motivations and interaction can assist lawyers in developing an appropriate rapport with the client and sense of
their professional role, as well as their interviewing and counseling
skills, and their problem-definition and problem-solving abilities,
among others.
The psychological aspects of lawyering are all too rarely articulated, taught or understood in law schools or offices.' However, in

121. The importance of teaching these skills along with a wide spectrum of other lawyering "skills and values" is the subject of a recent American Bar Association Task Force Report which criticized traditional legal education in this respect. See ABA Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Narrowing the Gap: Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Professional Values (1992)
(the "MacCrate Report"); see also Naomi Cahn & Norman Schneider, The Next Best Thing:
Transferred Clients in a Legal Clinic, 36 CATH. L. REV. 367, 377-78 (1987) (noting the
minimal attention to interpersonal aspects of lawyering in legal literature, and quoting Justice
Fortas for the proposition that lawyers' relationships with "clients, witnesses, judges and jurors" are at least as important as knowing the law) (citing Abe Fortas, The Legal Interview,
15 PsYcHIATRY 91 (1952)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss4/4

38

Meier: Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal P
19931

INTEGRATING PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

approximately the last five years, clinical legal educators have focused
more attention on these issues." The need for interpersonal skills is
especially great in the representation of battered women, which can
pose particular challenges to lawyers' capacity for empathy and powers of psychological understanding. The following discussion illustrates, with frequent reference to our experience in the DVAP, the
value of the psychological perspective in the teaching of interviewing
and counseling, and professional role definition in general. It further
addresses three common issues in the representation of battered women for which psychological sophistication is especially valuable:, client
ambivalence; danger assessment and strategic counseling; and management of "counter-transference," i.e., the strong personal feelings
evoked by these cases, in lawyers, judges, and all of the players in a
case.
1. Psychology of Lawyering-In General
a. Interviewing and Counseling Skills
Competent legal interviewing and counseling requires fundamental human and intellectual skills, such as empathy, connection, clarity
and focus. To be effective counselors, lawyers also need human and
professional judgment to discern what the client wants/needs from the
lawyer, e.g., advice or direction, and to determine how to advise her
without usurping her autonomy and decisionmaking. While to some
extent these "human skills" may be intuitive and a function of individual personality, a grasp of certain psychological concepts can be
very helpful in developing these sensitivities. As Binder, Bergman &
Price point out, every lawyer-client interaction is shaped by human
motivation and the needs of both lawyer and client."t To cultivate
the full and open communication which is necessary for effective

122. The two primary texts examining in depth the central role of "counseling" in a "client-centered" approach to lawyering, and the importance of psychological understanding in
competent counseling, are DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991) and ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING,
COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990); see also
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMEs R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A
NUTSHELL (1987); Stephen P. Ellman, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1992)
(discussing the need for and differences between "empathy" for and "approval" of clients by
lawyers); Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Context, 39 UCLA L. REv. 697 (1992)
(critiquing the Binder et al. and Bastress & Harbaugh texts as falling to adequately consider
socio-economic and political differences in the "contexts" of clinical representation).
123. BINDER ET AL, supra note 122, at 4-5.
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representation, lawyers should understand the potential psychological
obstacles to communication such as ego threats, role expectations, and
the impact of trauma, among others; as well as psychological

fulfacilitators of communication, including empathic understanding,
24
fillment of expectations, and affirmation, among others.1
Perhaps the single most important psychological ingredient to
developing an effective lawyer-client bond, is empathic understanding
on the part of the lawyer. People consulting lawyers are often in
distress, most obviously in family law and domestic violence cases.
Even the need to consult or depend on an "expert" can be in itself
disturbing. The confidentiality of lawyer-client communications also
invites greater confidence, and hence greater intimacy and
vulnerability."z Empathy from the lawyer is critical to ease communication for the client, maximize trust, and avoid 26disruptions in the
lawyer-client relationship and joint decisionmaking1
In essence, empathic understanding requires recognition of the
importance of peoples' feelings in affecting what they say or do, and
how and when they say or do it."2 This includes the knowledge
that peoples' feelings are often not articulated directly but are conveyed through nonverbal cues such as body language, or through
what people do not say (or do).s Once the client's feelings are rec-

124. Not surprisingly, Binder, Bergman and Price rely heavily on psychology and human
behavior analysts for their "crash course" in the primary psychological inhibitors and
facilitators of interviewing and counseling. See id. at 32-45.
125. Although many of these principles are universal, there are inevitable differences in
the power relationships and relative vulnerability of clients, depending on the type of client,
e.g., corporate clients vs. legal aid clients. See generally Dinerstein, supra note 122. at 71921 (emphasizing difference in psychological dynamic of lawyer-client relationship depending
on socio-economic "context" of clients).
126. Although they and other authors draw heavily on an analogy to the psychotherapistclient relationship for their discussion of the need for empathy in the lawyer-client relationship, Binder, Bergman and Price take pains to distinguish between the "elementary psychological principles" on which competent legal counseling is based, and the provision of psychological counseling, or uncovering of "unmet needs and conflicts," which is reserved for
trained mental health professionals. BINDER ET AL., supra note 122, at 34-35. It should be
noted that many aspects of the authors' discussions of psychological principles relevant to
legal counseling are also applicable to trial skills, such as the presentation of an effective
direct examination or persuasion in argument.
127. In response to the oft-voiced objection that "feelings are for 'shrinks,' not lawyers,"
Binder, Bergman and Price emphasize that "how people react emotionally to situations and to
proposed solutions strongly influences the nature and amount of information they provide and
the decisions they make." Id. at 62. They further note that "active listening" is not used to
"analyze feelings" as would be the case with a mental health professional, but to express
empathy for the client by "acknowledg[ing] a problem's emotional aspect when a client raises
it' Id.
128. Id. at 54-59; see infra note 157 (describing case in which the client repeatedly said

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss4/4

40

Meier: Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal P
19931

INTEGRATING PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

ognized (or inferred), empathy is expressed by active listening, including the explicit acknowledgement of the client's feelings, whether
stated or unstated. 29
Because interviewing and counseling draw so directly on psycholinguistic knowledge, the teaching of these skills is potentially a very
fruitful area for psychological input. This was borne out by our experience in the DVAP. In the seminar we taught interviewing and counseling through a roleplay in which pairs of students interviewed (students acting as) battered women clients who were seeking protection
orders."3 In addition, in the second semester we have provided ongoing feedback to students in the supervision context, by reviewing
tapes of their client interviews.
In both of these contexts I found the joint critiques by myself as
the lawyer and Dr. Dutton as a psychologist to be very complimentary. As a lawyer, my critique of the student interviews tends to focus
on the development of the case theory and necessary evidence, holes
in the information they obtained, their ability to counsel the client
regarding the available and applicable remedies, etc. As a psychologist, Dr. Dutton focuses on miscommunication, unspoken meanings,
unintended messages, and strengths and weaknesses in the students'
questioning modes. Key to her approach to interviewing is the notion
of the "meta-message." This concept derives from the psychology of
communication and the premise that many statements have implicit
unspoken messages. Sensitivity to the meta-message means maintaining awareness of the difference between what the speaker may intend
and what the listener may hear (by reading between the lines, observing body language, intonation, context of question, etc.). The lawyer
needs awareness of the meta-messages being sent in both directions:

she wanted to go forward with the case, but acted otherwise).
129. Id. at 46-58. Stephen Ellman suggests that legal proponents of "client-centered"

counseling may have over-emphasized the psychological counseling metaphor in their emphasis on pure non-judgmental "empathy." Ellman, supra note 122, at 1011-15 (citing BINDER ET
AL.. supra note 122, at 60). Pointing out several important differences between mental health
and legal professionals' functions and methods, he suggests that some express judgment or
"approval" of client goals and feelings may be more justified and appropriate in the legal
context than in the psychological one. Id. at 1011-12. I agree that approval is an important
means of demonstrating loyalty and commitment to the client and her goals. My use of the
word "empathy" is intended more broadly to include some expressions of approval. See infra
part IILD.2 for a discussion of the implications in the interdisciplinary teaching context of
this and other differences between lawyer-client and psychologist-patient relationships.
130. In the second semester, this classroom exercise was repeated quite successfully with
two new students in a "supervision" setting.
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in the clients' communications to the lawyer, and the lawyer's communications to the client.
The importance of the meta-message surfaced during both the
roleplay and the live interviews. In one roleplay, one interviewer
asked the battered woman client if she had thought about marital
counseling. The interviewer may only have intended to assess whether
the client is certain she wants to end the marriage, or whether she
may return to her partner. However, the psychological critique pointed
out that a client may well hear the question as an implicit suggestion
that she "should" attempt to preserve the marriage. This "meta-message" could make the interviewee feel defensive, insecure and/or
judged. Moreover, by suggesting that a non-legal intervention might
be appropriate it may also weaken her commitment to pursuing legal
intervention.
The tapes of live client interviews were similarly revealing: In
one case, the client asked the students whether her abuser would go
to jail if she pursued a criminal prosecution, noting that she thought
he really needed mental help. The students responded by "assuring"
her that jail was the usual result in these cases. In reviewing the tape,
it was apparent that the client did not want to "send" her abuser to
jail. The students' response, even if accurate,' 3' instead of reassuring
her, may have worried her, and deterred her from pursuing the criminal action. This exchange presented a meta-message which the students missed: that the client did not want her attacker to go to
jail.' Had they recognized the message, they might have explored
different responses. For example, they might have more fully discussed why the client felt that way, the pro's and con's of jail in this
case, as well as the possibility of obtaining the client's desired outcome, mental treatment.
The psychological perspective 3' also proved helpful in highlighting the need to express empathic understanding, in several ways.
For instance, in the roleplays we have identified questions which may
put clients off or make them uncomfortable, particularly in context of
a client who has been physically and emotionally abused. Such questions might concern whether the abuse has been going on throughout

131. In fact, first offenders in D.C. rarely if ever serve time in jail for domestic violence
assaults.
132. Possibly, there was also a meta-message in the students' response: that jail is the
"appropriate" disposition.
133. This perspective was not unique to Dr. Dutton, but she was able to identify and
frame the interchanges in helpful ways.
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the relationship, whether the woman has ever left, why she has returned, etc. Each of these questions may seem helpful to the interviewer who seeks to fully understand the relationship, but to the client may contain hidden criticism, e.g., that she should not have
stayed as long as she did. Feeling criticized can only undercut the
development of a strong and open lawyer-client relationship.
Similarly, a classic instance of the need for empathic expression
by lawyers was revealed in an interview tape: In this case, after the
client finished a ten-minute harrowing description of the single instance of violence she had experienced from her former lover, there
was complete silence. Then one of the students inquired as to the
type and size of the knife used in the attack. This instance was painful to hear on the tape, as the story seemed to cry out for an expression of human sympathy or horror. The lack of such an expression is
not a reflection of unfeeling students."3 Their non-response may
have been a function of a sub-conscious need to distance themselves
from the horror of the client's story.'35 It may also have been a reflection of an attempt to "act like a lawyer" by clinically investigating
the facts. If so, this story demonstrates the importance of the clinical
experience for helping students unlearn two years of learning to think
and act "like lawyers," and teaching them the importance of acting
"like a human being" while being a lawyer.
In sum, in listening to Dr. Dutton's critique of student interviews, I have found that she is able to hone in on and name interchanges which I might have found troubling but lacked the vocabulary to explain. As we have worked together I have acquired some of
the vocabulary and a better ability to frame these kinds of problems
in interviews. Since most lawyers have not been trained explicitly in
these counseling skills or psychological concepts, the participation of
a psychological expert can be invaluable in training students in these
skills. However, it is clear that the concepts can, at least to some
36
extent, also be mastered and taught by lawyers.
134. These students-as has been true of all DVAP participants-are extremely kind, caring individuals.
135. This need to distance oneself is often at the source of lawyers' "clinical" behavior
toward their clients. See infra part III.C.3 (discussing countertransference); SHAFFER &
ELKINS, supra note 122, at 55-60 (discussing The Lawyer Persona and the Feelings it Disguises).
136. Of course many lawyers are excellent interviewers or counselors, although only some
of them are conscious about the skills they employ in the doing. See DONALD SCHON, THE
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER 49-69 (1983) (describing the tacit "knowing-in-action" which all
competent professionals utilize in practice). However, psychological experts are by definition
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b. Lawyering Role
One of the most valuable but mercurial aspects of live-client
clinical training is the opportunity for students to begin to test out
their identity as lawyers. Issues and struggles surrounding the assumption of the lawyer's role are as many and varied as the people involved. For our purposes, I will focus on two particular instances in
the DVAP in which role definition was at issue, and for which the
psychological perspective was especially helpful. The first concerned
gender and race differentiation;
the second concerned expanding
the definition of the lawyer's role to include non-legal advice and
referrals.
Case 1: One of the student pairs in the DVAP representing battered women in civil protection order cases consisted of an AfricanAmerican woman and a white man. Their first client, like most
DVAP clients, was African-American."' Although the man had
worked with clients to some extent in his part-time job, the woman
had never worked with a client before. Both students came from
working-class families; the woman from D.C., and the man from
Baltimore. The students and I met the client for the first time down
at the court, where she was meeting with the prosecutor's office to
press criminal charges against her abuser. He had assaulted her the
night before and had been arrested. We interviewed her while she
was waiting to meet with the prosecutor. She consented to our representation to seek an immediate temporary protection order ('TPO")
(lasting two weeks) and then to represent her at a hearing for a oneyear civil protection order. Only one of the students could take the
lead in the TPO hearing; with little discussion it was agreed that the
man would do this.'39

specialists in these types of skills, are given explicit substantial training in them, and have
been taught to be conscious about their use, all of which make them more natural teachers
of such skills. Indeed, communication, listening, and counseling are the core elements of a
psychological clinician's professional work. Thus, in her previous work as director of a domestic violence training program for graduate students in psychology, Dr. Dutton's supervision
and teaching focused on developing precisely these skills.
137. See infra part llI.C.3 for a brief discussion of the role of gender in judges' responses to cases.
138. Pursuant to court rules, the clinic is permitted to provide student representation only
to "indigent" clients who would not otherwise be represented by the private bar. D.C. Sup.
Ct. Civ. Pro. R. 101(e); Ct. App. R. 48. In the District of Columbia, the vast majority of
indigents are African-American.
139. TPO hearings are conducted informally in a judge's chambers. Nonetheless, the
decision as to which student should handle the proceeding was easy because the man was
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The students (and myself) seemed to develop a strong and positive rapport with the client. She would kiss and hug them (and myself) when saying goodbye after meetings, as would her children. Not
until after the case had ended did I learn that the female student had
been irritated by her client's treatment of her. The client had more
than once asked the woman for non-legal assistance, such as rides to
and from meetings, chauffeuring of her children from place to place,
etc. The student had not felt comfortable turning these requests down,
yet she felt offended by them.
In a class session of "Grand Rounds," in which students shared
accounts of lawyering issues arising in their cases, the female
student's feelings surfaced. She cited her client's imposition on her
for rides, etc., as an example of unreasonable demands by clients, and
characterized her own consent as an example of a misguided playing
into her client's assumption of a "helpless" role. The class discussion
explored the "lawyering role," how one might draw appropriate
boundaries, and our hypotheses as to why clients request-and we
sometimes comply with requests for-non-legal assistance. Some intense debate was generated by the female student's strong feelings
that our clients are "just poor, not helpless." The issues were not
fully resolved in the class session.
Subsequently the students met with Dr. Dutton for their first
consultation. Partly as a result of this meeting and partly as a result
of their own discussions together, they recognized something which
had not surfaced in the class discussion: that the client had treated the
woman as her "friend" and the man as her "lawyer." For example,
the night after the TPO was obtained, when the abuser returned to the
home in violation of the Order, the client called the male student.
Even after the male student gave her his partner's phone number, she
typically did not call her with legal questions. Yet she seemed very
open and confiding toward the woman student, and seemed to feel
free to ask her for non-legal help. What became evident to the students in retrospect was that the client's response was partly a function
of their gender and race. It was easier for the client to perceive the
white male as the "real" lawyer, and the Black female as her "friend."

dressed in a suit and the woman was wearing blue jeans. I believe the students had the same
instincts concerning which of them would be the appropriate spokesperson with the judge. In
later discussions, the female student stated that she had worn casual clothes deliberately because she thought that would be less intimidating to the client than formal attire, and she
had not realized we might go before a judge that day. The assumptions underlying this decision were also elucidated in our discussions of the "lawyer's role."
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On further discussion with the supervisors, the students also
became aware that this differentiation may have been facilitated by
their own behaviors. For example, the woman wore very casual
clothes in the first meeting with the client, 4 ' and she told the client
that she had grown up quite near to where the client lived.'4' The
client's differentiation was also somewhat "natural" in light of the
female student's naturally more comfortable and casual way of interacting, as compared to the male student's more formal style of interaction.
The exploration of these and other factors which may have led
to the client's discriminatory treatment was useful for the students in
mapping out strategies for the future. The students made conscious
efforts to avoid playing into the stereotypes with their next client.
Different types of clothing were worn, they agreed that the woman
would assume the lead in the interview, and she consciously tried to
assume a style of interacting with the client which was more "professional" but still friendly. Whether because of these adjustments or for
other reasons, the same issues have not arisen in the students' work
with subsequent clients. 42
The point of this story is not to suggest that only a psychologist
can be expected to surface hidden issues of gender, race, and attorney-client relationship. Certainly, insightful and skilled lawyers can
and do identify similar issues with students and in their own practice.
However, the psychological analytic process is better suited to getting
at hidden, perhaps subconscious issues of interpersonal relationship
and feeling. Psychological professionals are also trained, at least to
some extent, to address sensitive interpersonal issues, such as those
related to race, gender, or class. In contrast, legal training is sadly

140. See supra note 139.
141. Relatively few people from this neighborhood, in which most residents are poor,
grow up to be lawyers. The student later stated that she revealed her own background as a
means of making connection with the client and minimizing any "intimidation" of the client
by herself.
142. By this example I do not mean to suggest that non-legal forms of help are inappropriate for lawyers. On the contrary, as the second case example demonstrates, I consider
certain types of non-legal assistance to be in certain circumstances an important aspect of
legal representation. Indeed, non-legal actions are inevitable in most types of legal representation, such as corporate practice in which the lawyers are known to "wine and dine" their
clients in order to cement the lawyer-client bond. In the case discussed above, however, the
appropriateness of the help requested was questionable, and, more importantly, that help appeared to be sought on a gendered and/or racial basis. These factors required the students to
examine and work out what they felt to be appropriate boundaries and roles, and to make
conscious efforts to assume those roles in the future.
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lacking in the explicit development of such interpersonal skills. 43
Moreover, more often than I like to admit, I find that the demands of
legal supervision of many students on active cases are such that the
"interpersonal" issues may be pushed to the background while more
immediately pressing lawyering and legal strategy issues are discussed. Having a co-teacher I can count on to assist students with
these issues strikes me as a sensible and effective division of labor.
Of course, as the legal supervisor I also endeavor to facilitate similar
"processing" of interpersonal issues with students.
Case 2: Psychosocial knowledge has also been important in
broadening DVAP students' developing notions of the lawyer's role.
Although as a lawyer I am strongly committed to the use and effectiveness of legal remedies for "family problems," it is nonetheless
undeniable that many forms of non-legal assistance are also helpful
and sometimes preferable to the client. It is critical in many forms of
practice, including domestic violence, for lawyers to develop awareness of their clients' needs for non-legal assistance, and to play some
role in addressing them.'
The active input of a psychologist in the DVAP has naturally
helped students to broaden their perspective to include non-legal
sources of help for their clients. For example, in one case in which
the client is an elderly mother of an abusive adult son, the client was
extremely ambivalent about seeking an order excluding her approximately forty-year-old son from her home. For the first two months
the students focused on interviewing the client and counseling her
gently concerning her options. One option identified with the help of
Dr. Dutton was the possibility of psychological counseling to assist
the client in learning to say "no" to her son, and not to give in under
his constant wheedling and pressure. The students expended extensive
time and energy in tracking down possible counseling services for
elderly indigent clients. In part motivated by this casework, this team
of students also decided to make a comprehensive non-legal resource

143. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
144. Although I share many writers' skepticism about the substitution of non-legal remedies for legal remedies in family law cases, see supra note 99, it is still true that various
forms of counseling and other social services can also be necessary for clients with many
levels of stress and difficulty, and in some cases they may find these preferable to legal
action. Other types of practice where lawyers need to cultivate other resources such as counseling, include employment discrimination, AIDs, mental health law, and criminal defense and
juvenile law. In the criminal field, treatment for substance abuse or other forms of counseling
can be critical to both the individual and to the legal case.
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and referral list their "non-litigation" project for the clinic.
The image of the "lawyer as social worker" sometimes causes
scorn for legal service or family law work.'45 In fact, lawyers in

most types of practice engage in many activities and forms of counseling which are not strictly legal but are an inherent part of the
lawyer-client relationship."" In any event, in my opinion, especially
if one works with an underprivileged population such as the poor,47

one must be willing to engage in "non-legal" activities for the client's
welfare. If the client is unable to get to and from meetings because
of a lack of transportation, providing the transportation may be necessary to effect the goals of the representation. If the client cannot
make decisions and follow them through because of emotional obstacles, or if a client has a substance abuse problem and is seeking
rights of access to children, finding her treatment or counseling may
also be appropriate. In the law school clinic, what is essential is that
these questions of role definition be surfaced and addressed, regard-

less of the particular resolutions which may be reached in particular
cases. The participation of a psychologist has been helpful in broadening our focus to include exploration of different non-legal options
and services. 4
2. Psychology in the Representation of Battered Women
In the representation of battered women, there are certain issues
which regularly arise, which pose a challenge to lawyers' counseling
and psychological skills. In essence, in dealing with domestic violence, available legal remedies are frequently inadequate and never

145. "I'm a lawyer, not a social worker" is a familiar refrain among some lawyers.
146. See supra notes 142 & 144. To me, working with and assisting human beings, and
being exposed to the complexities of their lives, is part of the reward of family law and
legal service work. An example of non-legal client assistance in the realm of private practice,
was aired in one installment of the television show LA. Law. Family lawyer Arnie represented a sexually inexperienced and despondent client who was caving in to unreasonable demands by his wife in the divorce. Amie introduced him to an attractive and sexually sophisticated woman. When she initiated a relationship with the client, it gave him new self-esteem,
and he decided to stand up for his rights in the divorce.
147. The same is probably true of work representing the mentally ill, people with AIDS,
and many criminal defendants, among others.
148. In the future we anticipate this expanded vision to be furthered by a collaborative
working relationship with the Emergency Medicine Department of the George Washington
University Medical School. Dr. Dutton, as a new Research Professor and Director of that
Department's "Violence Program" will be working to develop a protocol for the Emergency
Medicine Department's response to victims of battering. One longterm goal is to bring medical and law students together to work with battering victims.
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ideal. Because the fear of retaliation hovers over virtually any action
they may take, battered women are often (understandably) ambivalent
about what to do. Moreover, as supra part II suggests, being subjected to chronic violence, and society's failure to intervene to stop it,
can be so demoralizing and disempowering that some clients feel that
nothing will help while everything may hurt.'49
This context gives rise to the need for particular sensitivity and
skill in counseling battered women with respect to at least two issues:
(1) identifying and coping with client ambivalence; and (2) assessing
dangerousness and providing strategic counseling. In addition, some
psychological awareness is also important to deal with counter-transference in the responses of all players to the client and case. The
following discusses the value of psychological understanding in
teaching students to manage these three aspects of the representation
of battered women.
a. Battered Womens' Ambivalence
Perhaps not surprisingly, the relevance of the psychosocial aspects of domestic violence comes into much sharper focus in context
of students' struggles with their individual cases. When representing
individual women, whom they need to understand, strategically counsel, and advocate for, students are forced to confront and examine
many of their and society's assumptions about the meaning and context of their clients' experiences. These issues very often converge
around 5 the problem of clients' ambivalence about pursuing legal
action."
In the DVAP, at some point during the first semester, all students working with women in civil protection order cases experienced
a client's withdrawal, disappearance, or backing off of all or some
part of the initially-intended legal action. t This phenomenon-and
149. As described supra part UI.B.I, Walker's concept of "learned helplessness" as a psychological phenomenon has increasingly been re-cast in terms of "actual helplessness" because
of social "entrapment" and lack of protection. A client's sense of futility may also be greater
if she is poor, young, and/or not economically self-sufficient, as is true of many battered
women. See Dutton, supra note 4, at 1231-40 (calling for examination of socio-economic and

other "context" in expert evaluations of battered women).
150. See, e.g., Gary Brown et al., Comment, Starting a TRO Project: Student Representation of Battered Women, 96 YA.E U. 1985, 2014 (1987) (describing student-run project and
discussing need to prepare participants for clients' ambivalence and high drop-out rate).
151. In four cases handled by three different teams, the clients pursued and then withdrew from pursuing civil protection orders. One of these was a mother of an abusive son,
rather than the usual intimate partner. In a fifth case, a client initially wanted to pursue con-
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the challenge it poses for would-be service providers-has not been

satisfactorily addressed by advocates for battered women, in part
because they are reluctant to contribute to society's tendency to blame

battered womens' ambivalence for the system's failures to take action.
In fact, it is my view that the ambivalence of these women is

largely a response to society's persistent messages to the victim that
(a) her experiences of domestic violence are trivial, (b) her allegations
are untrue, (c) the violence is her fault, and (d) there is nothing that
can be done. In short, battered womens' ambivalence about their
situation and choices is simply a direct reflection of society's own
ambivalence about domestic violence.'
Nonetheless, there is also a discernible and genuinely personal

component of many battered women's ambivalence about taking legal
action: In many cases they love the man, don't want to hurt him, and
are reluctant to give up the relationship. Putting aside many socio-

tempt charges for her abuser's violation of a temporary protection order, she later decided not
to do so. However, this client did go through with obtaining a one-year protection order. In
other cases, clients were ambivalent but ultimately went through with the CPO.
Interestingly, in the second semester no client had withdrawn as of the date of this
writing. It is not unlikely that the students' increased competence in counseling and legal
skills, improved the lawyer-client bonding and reduced the dropout rate. However, the sample
is too small to draw any conclusions.
152. See supra part H.B.I; GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 52, at 22-23, 28; Czapanskiy,
supra note 32, at 253-58; Dutton, supra note 4, at 1220; Meier, supra note 20, at 4-5, 7-8.
This phenomenon is exquisitely demonstrated by a story told by one of my (non-clinical) colleagues of his experience as a prosecutor. He was assigned the prosecution of a man who
had shot at his lover. The case was charged as a misdemeanor (presumably because it was a
"domestic" case). The female victim subsequently requested to have the case dropped. The
prosecutor's office refused, and subpoenaed the victim's appearance on the trial date. She
appeared, hand in hand with the defendant. When the prosecutor asked the office's permission
to dismiss the prosecution, he was ordered instead to continue with it. In frustration, he did
so. To his surprise, in the middle of jury selection, the defendant announced that he wished
to plead guilty rather than go to trial. The case was quickly converted into a sentencing
hearing. When the judge asked the victim what sentence she sought, the prosecutor was dismayed, assuming she would request no punishment. To his shock, she asked the judge to
incarcerate the defendant. (He was then sentenced to 30 days.)
The key moral of this story (which is rich in other strategic, policy issues) is this:
battered womens' ambivalence about "hurting" their abuser by taking legal action against him,
and their emotional attachment to the abuser, is in part a response to society's own ambivalence about violence in relationships. When society-in the form of the criminal justice
system-speaks firmly and affirmatively against domestic violence, and treats it as a crime,
battered women are empowered to stand up for their own right not be abused even by someone they may love. When society consistently recognizes and acts in accord with "justice,"
both victims and offenders will be more likely to do the same. This is one of the most
important-and most difficult to teach-lessons students can learn in a domestic violence
clinic.
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economic reasons why many women attempt to make their relationship work,'53 womens' personal ambivalence may also be explainable by several psychological phenomena. For instance, a woman may
love her abuser because he has only hit her once and they have had
an otherwise loving relationship, because they have had children
together, because he is the first man who has over loved her, or for
any number of other "normal" reasons to love someone."s Battered
women may also develop greater dependency on their abusers as a
result of the batterer's abuse and forced isolation. In especially severe
hostage-like cases, a woman may develop a kind of "traumatic bonding" in which the batterer's threats to harm and the victim's isolation
and inability to escape, in conjunction with occasional kindnesses
from her "captor," makes her more psychologically as well as physically dependent upon him.'55
Ambivalence about pursuing legal action can also stem from
other very realistic concerns: Some women may correctly fear retaliation by the abuser, based on their knowledge of the abuser's personality and psychology. Others who are suffering from PTSD may avoid
talking to their legal representatives, miss appointments, or avoid
going to court because they cannot bear to re-invoke the traumatic
experiences by talking and thinking about them.'56
Because social understanding of the psychology of domestic
violence is limited, inexperienced lawyers often either fail to register
signs of their clients' ambivalence, or react critically to those signs
they do notice. Either of these responses can be damaging to their
ability to represent their client. For example, a lawyer may push a
case forward when it is not in the client's best interest, because the
lawyer fails to identify and appropriately weigh the client's fear of

153. For example, the existence of children in common, lack of economic ability to
support herself and her children, lack of anywhere else to live, etc.
154. See Hara Estroff Marano, Inside the Heart of Marital Violence, PSYCHOLOGY ToDAY, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 48 (discussing new psychological research and treatment which is
beginning to show the complexity of battering relationships, including loving aspects, ultradependency of abusive men, the fact that women are typically "the more functional" members
of the relationship; and also development of new form of feminist couples therapy in which
batterers are held completely responsible for their abuse and abuse must stop before therapy
begins).
155. Dutton, supra note 4, at 1224-25. It is important to bear in mind that womens' ambivalence about taking steps adverse to the abuser is not the same thing as ambivalence
about the violence itself. I have seen little or no support years of litigation such cases for
the old theory that battered women don't "choose" to "end" the violence because they masochistically like it. See Marano, supra note 154, at 52.
156. Dutton, supra note 4, at 1198 n.35.
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retaliation, where the client has stated that she wants to go for-

ward.'57 Alternatively, a lawyer may feel critical of a client's ambivalence, because she feels that battered women need to take action

against their abusers, and that their ambivalence is a form of selfdestructiveness.'55 The lawyer's feelings may well be sensed by the
client even when they are not expressed directly; this will make some
clients even less direct and open about their feelings, or more likely
to say whatever they think their lawyer wants to hear. In one DVAP
case, the client sensed the students' criticism of her own ambivalence
about taking legal action, and suddenly became unreachable by telephone. Eventually, when the students sent a more empathic and nonjudgmental message to her neighbor (whose phone she used), stating
that the students were perfectly comfortable with whatever the client
wanted to do, the client miraculously materialized on the other end of
the telephone and informed them that she did not currently want to
proceed.'59
157. In one DVAP case, the client was pursuing a civil protection order because the
shelter required her to obtain such an order before she could move into their transitional
housing. She told the students that her mother was advising her not to take the man to
court, since he was leaving her alone now, and taking legal action might provoke him. However, she stand that she wanted to go ahead with the action because she had to get into the
transitional housing. Nonetheless, she did a number of things which may have signaled her
deeper ambivalence, including being impatient with the students on the phone, avoiding talking to them, and promising to have a friend serve the papers, but week after week failing to
have them served. After two continuances had been obtained and the papers were still not
served, the students asked her to return the papers so they could hire a professional process
server. Within a day after the client was informed that the process server had been hired, she
left the shelter, returned briefly to pack up, and then disappeared completely. Unfortunately,
the students did not learn of her disappearance before the papers were served. Because the
students were responding to her explicit expression of her wishes (that she wanted the CPO
despite her ambivalence), and she had never expressly asked the students not to serve the
papers, the depth of her inner resistance to going forward (presumably based on her fear)
was not recognized or addressed. Apart from the obvious questions this scenario raises regarding mandatory policies of shelters regarding CPOs, it is a compelling example of the
importance for lawyers of developing some psychological sophistication in representation of
battered women.
This is not intended to suggest that lawyers should be expected to second-guess express instructions from a client. However, a greater range and depth of counseling abilities
can enable lawyers to identify the client's ambivalence, to surface the issue with the client,
and to assist her in clarifying and making her own explicit decision. In the case described,
regardless of the choice made, an explicit determination would have been better for all concerned. If the client feared legal action would put her at greater risk, ideally that risk would
have been assessed jointly and weighed, before the papers were served and the "milk spilt."
158. This attitude is omnipresent in society, including among feminists who strongly
advocate against domestic violence. To some degree hostility toward ambivalent clients is
probably also a form of counter-transference. See infra part Irl.C.3.
159. A client's desire to appear un-ambivalent to a lawyer can be fatal at trial, e.g.,
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In short, it is critical that a domestic violence legal clinic educate
the students about the sources of battered womens' ambivalence, and
assist the students in developing their abilities to read between the
lines of what their clients may tell them explicitly, i.e., to hear the
meta-message. Basic psychological concepts, such as the nature and
reasons for human ambivalence in these contexts, the phenomenon of
"denial," and the nature and effects of PTSD, can be very helpful.
Ultimately, students' ability to empathize with the ambivalence inherent in their clients' situations, will most likely determine their capacity to assist those clients.
b. Assessing Danger and Providing Strategic Counseling
Given the possible ambivalence of many battered women, as well
as the usual confusion and misinformation plaguing many laypeople
concerning the legal system, lawyers for battered women often need
to play a relatively affirmative counseling role, which may not come
naturally to some students. Such counseling might include providing
the client with some perspective on her situation, e.g., assuring her
that it is not her fault, that her experiences are not uncommon, and
that without significant social or legal intervention the cycle of violence is likely to continue. This type of feedback seeks to reduce the
client's sense of fault and inadequacy which an abusive relationship
fosters, to strengthen her morale and to support her tentative decision
to take action."6
However, a crucial dimension of client counseling for any service provider in this field is the danger assessment. In seeking to help
a woman who has been chronically violently attacked by someone in
a close relationship to her, every step considered must include an assessment of whether it will increase or decrease the danger she faces.
This assessment requires a degree of fine-tuned, nuanced comprehenwhen a client tells the lawyer that she has not been in contact with the batterer, but at trial
it comes out that she has in fact slept with him recently, and this fact (and her denial) is
used to discredit all of her testimony. The point of this example is not to suggest that women are not entitled to legal protection if they do in fact choose to have contact with their
abuser, but merely to point out that a lawyer will be unable to combat the adverse uses of
such facts if she has no advance notice of them. For example, with accurate knowledge of
the facts, the lawyer may be able to help the client show that the reconciliation was coerced,

or that it was reasonable for other reasons, but that the violence was still inexcusable.
160. In one DVAP case, both students commented that after one of them told the client
in the initial interview that her story sounded like "a classic case" of the cycle of violence,
the client visibly relaxed and appeared greatly comforted and relieved. See HERMAN, supra
note 23, at 68 (victims of abuse often blame themselves).
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sion of the client's situation which is often not intuitively grasped by
new lawyers.
The danger assessment is complicated by the fact that many
peoples' assumptions about the nature of abusive relationships vastly
over-simplify the reality. This was illustrated in an early class session
of the DVAP. We were discussing the availability of ex parte "temporary protection orders" ("TPOs") which may be obtained on an
emergency basis without notice to the respondent, when the petitioner
fears imminent danger from him. In the midst of our discussion of
the legal proof required to obtain a TPO, one student asked "why
wouldn't you always get a TPO? Wouldn't these women always be in
imminent danger?" The simple answer is "[n]o, women in these relationships are not always in imminent danger; they are not beaten 24
hours a day, 7 days a week; in fact, abusers are people; they are
sometimes nice." However, I found it harder than I expected to answer this question. This was because the articulation of the question
itself suggested a host of (inaccurate) assumptions about who batterers
and their victims are, how and when the abuse occurs, and what life
is like for such people.16' Assumptions such as these are widespread.
Adequate education about the psychosocial context of domestic
violence is essential to give the student-lawyer a more accurate basic
framework of assumptions within which to assess the information
provided by the client. At a minimum, understanding of the "cycle of
violence" tells us that violence does not occur twenty-four hours a
day. A more in-depth understanding might entail education about
what is known about abusers, including their ability to be charming,
appealing, and needy, and recognition that abusive relationships are,
like all relationships, complex, and held together by a web of connections. 2
A reasonably accurate perception of the client's situation is vital
to a lawyer's ability to help the client assess the degree of danger she

161. The other side of the coin of the notion that people in battering relationships share
nothing but violence, is the pervasive social misconception that a "normal" woman who experiences violence in a relationship would and should immediately end all contact with the
perpetrator, and that women who remain in the relationship are "asking for it." This view
reflects the fallacious notion that relationships are either all bad or all good, leaving no room
for the human reality that we all make compromises in relationships, and frequently tolerate
pain in the hope that problems in a relationship can be improved.
162. See Mahoney, supra note 9, at 19-24 (emphasizing ways in which motherhood complicates questions of "staying" or "leaving").
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is in, and decide what-if any-action to pursue. In determining
whether a TPO, a CPO, possible criminal prosecution, or no legal
action is preferable, lawyers and clients must differentiate between
imminent and non-imminent danger, and identify what kinds of events
may trigger violence. If the client fears legal action will provoke
more violence, the lawyer and client must decide if protection can be
found, or if the risk is not worth the potential gain. Lawyers must
also assist clients in assessing whether the degree of danger suggests
that the client's first priority should be fleeing to a shelter, out of
state, etc. Alternatively, the lawyer can explain to the client why legal
action is often beneficial, and give the client some hope, which she
undoubtedly needs. In short, because many battered women have been
living entrapped in fear for some time, the lawyer's support and
outside perspective can be very helpful in helping the client break
through the fears and make constructive decisions about strategy.
Finally, while providing the client with some perspective on the
utility of legal interventions-and likelihood of future violence-lawyers must be able to walk the fine line between "counseling" the client and "deciding" for her. One must be able to go beyond clients' often self-protective quick answers, and offer competing
perspectives, but at the same time clearly communicate that the decision on how to weigh all the competing factors is the client's to
make. This type of in-depth, nuanced counseling may be more than is
reasonable to expect most students to achieve quickly. Experience is
undoubtedly needed to learn to recognize and entertain simultaneously
many overlapping, potentially conflicting, and uncertain options and
outcomes. Psychosocial education about domestic violence and interpersonal counseling skills can provide an intellectual foundation and
some rudimentary skills; over time, experience must supply the rest.
3. The Personal Dimension: Dealing with Counter-Transference
In addition to understanding clients and basic elements of interpersonal interaction, psychological understanding can help a lawyer
understand the personal dimensions of their own responses to their
client and those of other players in the case. In domestic violence
cases, personal psychological responses by all players-judges, lawyers, and others-to victims and their problems are often intense and
often affect their professional responses. Some of these feelings help
performance of the professional role; some interfere with professional
performance. Understanding counter-transference and learning to identify it in oneself and (be prepared for it in) others is important for
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lawyers who seek to practice in this field.
The training setting provides students the opportunity to learn
sensitivity to these issues in a context where they can safely explore
the personal psychological aspects of lawyering without professional
consequences. Although in the DVAP we did not explicitly teach
about counter-transference, Dr. Dutton in her consultations frequently
focuses on the students' feelings about the lawyering process (as do I
to a lesser extent in supervision). Because I believe that even without
explicitly teaching the concept, an understanding of it is valuable in
teaching and supervision, the following discusses counter-transference
and its application in the context of representation of battered women,
and briefly describes its relevance in context of one DVAP student's
experience.
Ever since the Oedipus complex made its way into popular culture, the Freudian concept of subconscious motivations for conscious
adult behaviors has been part of much ordinary discourse, if often in
a jocular mode. 63 Far less well known are the Freudian concepts of
"transference" and "counter-transference," which are essential elements
of the psychology of all human relationships, and especially those
between professionals and clients. These concepts evolved from the
psychoanalytic discovery that one's most important early relationships,
typically with parents or siblings, create "blueprints" that remain
inside us as adults. Frequently, other people evoke feelings in us
which are driven more by our early emotional experiences than by
the current person or situation." 4 In the therapeutic relationship, the
patient's imposition of past emotional experiences on the patient's
present-day relationship with the doctor was called "transference" by
Freud. Somewhat later, the equal vulnerability of doctors to having
their own personal histories affect their responses65 to their patients,
was recognized and termed "counter-transference."'
The importance of counter-transference in the therapeutic treatment of patients has been recognized to some degree in the psychological professions." Writers in the psychological field have ac163. TOM LEHRER, Oedipus Rex, on AN EVENING WASTED WITH TOM LEHRER (Reprise
Records 1994) (about a boy who "loved his mother").
164. Allwyn J. Levine, M.D., Transference and Countertransference: How it Affects You
and Your Client, 15 FAM. ADVOC. 14 (1992).
165. Id.; J.Sandier etal., Basic Psychoanalytic Concepts: IV. Counter-Transference,BRrr.
J. PSYCHIATRY 83, 83-88 (1970). The term "counter-transference" is subject to varying usages
which can extend broadly to all personal responses of one person to another. For purposes of
this Article I use the term in its broader sense.
166. For just a sample of the existing articles in the psychology literature, see Patricia
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knowledged that counter-transference

sometimes causes emotional

reactions which hinder the professional's effectiveness by, e.g., causing her to identify too strongly with one or another of the players in
the patient's life, or causing her to be overwhelmed with feeling
which may cloud judgment or inhibit rational responses, etc. 67 At a
more basic level, it has been noted that therapists who have
conflictual personal feelings about patients may withdraw from the
engagement, becoming overly detached and indifferent. 6 ' Problem-

atic forms of counter-transference have been most frequently identified in child abuse and neglect cases, which are apt to evoke very

passionate responses, but sometimes render otherwise competent professionals surprisingly incompetent.'
There can be little doubt that counter-transference operates also
in the attorney-client relationship.'70 Moreover, because countertransference operates in any relationship between a professional and
lay person, it is also at work in the reactions to the parties of all the
players in a case, including the judge, social worker, bailiffs and
clerks, as well as the attorneys. Family law and domestic violence
cases in particular often invoke intense emotional responses in the

professionals involved because they tap into such fundamental feelings
about women, men, and families.'
Reynolds-Mejia & Sylvia Levitan, Counter-Transference Issues in the In-Home Treatment of
Child Sexual Abuse, CHILD WELFARE, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53, 53-61; Sandler et al., supra note
165; Joseph J. Tobin, (Counter)transference and Failure in Intercultural Therapy, ETHOS,
Summer 1986, at 120-43; Jock Wilson, Counselling with Transference and Counter-Transference, BRrr. J. GUIDANCE & COUNSE.LLNG, Jan. 1974, at 15, 15-26.
167. Reynolds-Mejia & Levitan, supra note 166, at 56-59 (describing dysfunctional reactions of professionals in in-home treatment of child abuse cases); Tobin, supra note 166, at
130-42 (describing complex history of mental health workers' failure to help foreign co-worker/patient having mental breakdown).
168. Reynolds-Mejia & Levitan, supra note 166, at 57-58.
169. Sara Latz, J.D., M.D., Counter-Transference in the Treatment of Child Abuse, Presentation to the Family Law Section at Annual Meeting of the AALS (Jan. 7, 1994). Dr.
Latz described a child neglect case in which very competent therapists and attorneys reacted
with vehemence and passion, but failed to reach appropriate dispositions because they had
overlooked basic and critical information in the child's records. See also Reynolds-Mejia &
Levitan, supra note 166, at 57.
170. SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 122, at 66-71 (discussing counter-transference and
stating that it is vital in allkinds of cases to be self-aware and conscious of one's own
needs, resentments and mixed signals in interacting with clients); Cahn & Schneider, supra
note 121, at 381-83; I. Gene Schwartz, The Attorney/Client Relationship from a
Psychotherapist's Perspective, 20 COLO. LAW. 1837 (1991).
171. In fact, as Martha Mahoney points out, assuming an incidence rate of at least one
incident in 25% of households, "at least four of the fifteen or more actors in an average
criminal action-jurors, judge and attorneys-probably will have experienced or committed at
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Since counter-transference includes all personal feelings in reac-

tion to a client, it is inherent in all relationships, and is not something which can be avoided.

And in many ways, counter-transfer-

ence is positive. In psychology, the therapist's counter-transference
feelings are often a valuable clue to understanding the patient and
may be essential to the success of the treatment.' In the legal profession, counter-transference is operating beneficially wherever people
are personally committed to their work due to strong empathy for the
population they serve. For instance, womens' identification with
womens' rights issues such as domestic violence can fuel a strong

empathy for battered women clients, conviction about their cause and
strong advocacy on their behalf. 74
On the other hand, identification with (or "empathy for") a vic-

tim does not always result in benign and supportive responses. It may
be counter-intuitive to realize that sharing a common experience or

fear of victimization with a party may create antipathy rather than
sympathy in the observer. For instance, not infrequently a female
judge or attorney will react critically to a battered woman, e.g. blaming her for "not leaving" the abuser. While this hostility might be
interpreted as a lack of empathy or ignorance of the victim's situation, it is a least as likely that a harsh response reflects the strong
need the observer has to separate herself from the victim and to
believe that she would never be, or was not in the past, such a vic-

tim.

175

least one domestic assault." Mahoney, supra note 9, at 13-14.
172. Because counter-transference reactions can interfere with professional effectiveness
when not examined, people often assume that counter-transference is "bad." In fact, countertransference is inherent in all human interaction, and is only "bad" when it is unexamined
and causes personal responses to overtake professional ones in a destructive way. Telephone
Interview with Sarah Latz, M.D. (Feb. 28, 1994).
173. See Wilson, supra note 166, at 24-25 (describing the progress made by social workers who felt frustrated by their clients, when they understood that their angry feelings were
not a sign of professional failure but rather were "pointers toward understanding their clients'
problems").
174. Feminists' empathy and identification can also take more complex forms, as is described in Abbe Smith's article about what it means to be a feminist public defender, Rosie
O'Neill Goes to Law School, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1993).
175. The human need to distance oneself from victims by "blaming the victim" is not
limited to battered women. A friend told me that when his apartment was burglarized, his
neighbors questioned him insistently about what he or his wife could have done to be responsible for the break-in. As the burglars had knocked a hole through the wall to get in,
the neighbors were unsuccessful in identifying some act or failure on the part of my friends
that they could point to as causing the crime-therefore they could not comfort themselves
that this would not happen to them. See Frieze & Browne, supra note 24, at 165-66 (blam-
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The presence of negative counter-transference among judges in

family law cases is inferable from the well-known phenomena that the
family docket is anathema to most judges, and that judges in family
court frequently express disrespectful attitudes towards the parties and
the cases.'76 Where such disparagement has been directed selectively
at women, it has been (appropriately) described as gender bias.'"
This kind of personal bias against female victims of domestic violence is unquestionably pervasive, particularly among male judges,
and needs little extra analysis. However, it is far more counter-intu-

itive to realize that some hostility to victims (particularly from female
judges), may reflect, not a lack of empathy, but rather, too much: i.e.,

over-identification.'78 And even a sympathetic response borne of the

urge to help abuse victims can sometimes backfire, if it creates an
overly personal need to "rescue" the victim which pushes the professional beyond the boundaries of her role and causes her to have too
personal a stake in the outcome.'79

ing the victim is common but especially so for female victims of domestic violence).
176. In the District of Columbia the problem of judicial discomfort with family cases
was recently and insightfully acknowledged by the incoming presiding Judge of the Family
Division of the local court in a speech to the Bar Association. She emphasized the importance of good judging in these cases, and stated that some competent psychological consultation or training for the bench might be of assistance in helping judges separate their intense
personal feelings from their professional task, thereby improving their approach to cases. The
Honorable Susan Winfield, Address to the Family Law Section of the District of Columbia
Bar (Sept. 30, 1993).
177. Especially in the early days of domestic violence litigation for civil protection orders, the examples of judicial abusiveness to battered women were legion and shocking. See,
e.g., Joan Meier, Battered Justice, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1987, at 37. 43-45 (detailing several stories of judges' abusive treatment of battered women in courts in Massachusetts, Chicago. and other jurisdictions). One Massachusetts judge, Paul Hefferman. was eventually removed from the bench in the wake of a major scandal over the murder of a woman who
had sought protection in his court and been treated abusively by him. This caused an investigation, and his history as a wife-beater was discovered. Another judge sat for two years on
domestic violence cases after it was discovered that he had severely beaten his wife at least
three times. He retired with an unblemished record. Id. at 45. This problem is far from eliminated, as recent gender bias studies disturbingly indicate. See Czapanskiy, supra note 48,
passim (describing "negative synergy" between judicial bias against battered women and female lawyers).
178. JUDrrH HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 177-89 (1981) (describing different
forms of counter-transference between female and male therapists when treating victims of
child sexual abuse including distance or overwhelmedness, helplessness and anxiety for women, who identify with the victim, and titillation or lack of empathy for the victim by males,
who identify with the perpetrator).
179. Reynolds-Mejia & Levitan, supra note 166, at 56, 59 (the "human urge to help the
afflicted and helpless . . . can actually block the therapeutic process" if it creates in the
therapist an inability to help the victim process her destructive feelings, or produces an unre-
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While there is little that can be done to eliminate professionals'

experience of counter-transference, it is possible for lawyers, judges
and other professionals to minimize the detrimental effects of such

responses. Not surprisingly, the psychological professions are far more
advanced than the legal profession in their recognition of, and approach to dealing with, this issue. Peer support, feedback, and profes-

sional "supervision" are routinely recommended means of coping with
and understanding counter-transference in mental health professions.s In the legal profession, however, the term "counter-transference" is little known, and acknowledgement of personal or emotional

reactions to legal cases is not a staple of professional dialogue."'
However, recognition of this issue may be slowly emerging, as evi-

denced by increasing public forums devoted in part to this subject.
All legal professionals, but especially those in the domestic violence field, need to learn to recognize and separate out those of their

personal responses which may interfere with professional efficacy.
There is an irony to this prescription, since the womens' movement

in this country was built on-and feminism in most of its forms
starts from-the recognition that "the personal is the political." '

It

alistic need to "rescue" the victim).
180. Id. at 61 (recommending that in-home child abuse therapists make use of "abundant
peer support and feedback to manage and reduce countertransference anxiety, helplessness,
grandiosity, and anger").
181. The few legal sources discussing counter-transference in the legal context that this
author was able to identify are cited in supra notes 164 and 170. Indeed, because of the aggressively intellectual and unemotional nature of the legal profession and law schools, vulnerable dialogue of this sort among professionals or students may not be possible in traditional
settings, such as the classroom. However, in some gatherings, such as one-on-one supervision,
or the recent forum at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law
Schools, greater intimacy is possible. This forum, titled Our Experiences of Harm: Teaching
About Painful Subjects, was sponsored by the American University "Women and the Law
Project" and was very well-attended. Several law professors shared stories of experiences of
being forced to deal with student comments or inquiries touching on issues of extreme vulnerability due to the teachers' personal histories, including experiences of spousal abuse, child
abuse, racial or gender discrimination and homophobia. Not all the comments concerned painful pasts; some participants spoke of the pain of working with dying AIDs patients.
Some writers in the field have recently acknowledged a personal history of abuse, in
a context where the purpose appears to be to puncture stereotypes and bring family abuse
"out of the closet." See, e.g., ANN JONES, Preface to NEXT TIME SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATTERING AND How TO STOP IT (1994); Mahoney, supra note 9, at 8.
182. The principle is still true in many respects and remains a core belief of most feminists, including myself. See Michele Bograd, Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse: An Introduction, in FEMINIST PERSPECtivES ON WIFE ABUSE 23 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds.,
1988) (stating that feminist researchers reject the role of neutral detached observer, and instead bring their feelings into the research process); Schneider, supra note 29, at 520 (1992)
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may be that our ability to go beyond the first recognition of the
connection, to a more multi-dimensional understanding of the interaction between "personal" and "political," is a sign of feminism's growing maturity. This more complex understanding would contemplate

that to the extent that our personal feelings produce empathy and
commitment consistent with professional role, "the personal" is consistent with "the professional."'' However, when the personal inter-

feres with professional role, the boundary between the two identities
should remain distinct.184
In light of the foregoing, it would be desirable to educate law
students in the clinical setting about counter-transference 8 5 a concept which will stand them in good stead throughout their career. Because law students, unlike students studying to be mental health professionals, are not necessarily believers in psychological introspection,
let alone in the notion that their childhoods have profoundly shaped
their adult existence, and because lawyers and law professors are

themselves barely aware of the concept of counter-transference, I have
not made it a priority to teach the concept in a formal way. However,
as noted above, both Dr. Dutton and I encourage students to talk
about their personal reactions to their lawyering experiences. Enabling
students to gain some clarity about their motivations and personal
issues in regard to work with battered women is an important goal of
the DVAP, which has been at least partly successful.

Thus, in the course of the year, there were times when personal

("Feminist theory rests on the fundamental notion that women's experience is the central
starting point of theory."); Smith, supra note 174, at 52 (connection between inner feelings
and thoughts, opinions and public conduct is primary "lesson" of feminism).
183. Once the professional has "worked through" his or her counter-transference reactions,
he or she is best situated to form a professionally "empathic relationship" with the patient.
HERMAN, supra note 178, at 184, 188. In contrast, professionals who deny that they have
any personal responses to clients, and therefore do not work them through, are likely to be
somewhat handicapped in their professional interactions with the client. Reynolds-Mejia &
Levitan, supra note 166, at 55.
184. Discerning when personal involvement leads to appropriate empathy, and when it
disrupts professional efficacy is not always easy. However, one signal is the eruption of an
unprofessional hostility toward a case or party. See Wilson, supra note 166, at 24-25. Frequently such hostility has its source in over-identification or over-involvement. Because this is
somewhat counter-intuitive, I have found this cue to be helpful in discussing with students
why they feel hostile toward a client.
185. Cahn & Schneider, supra note 121, at 381-82 (emphasizing intense counter-transference issues which arise for student lawyers dealing with their frst clients). Cahn and
Schneider imply that counter-transference is a particular problem for new clinicians. Id. Although there may be personal issues particular to new clinicians, counter-transference exists to
some extent for all professionals in all cases.
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histories appeared to get in the way of fully effective advocacy for
battered women clients and their children. In one such instance, a
very bright, committed and empathic student became more reticent
and passive as she entered into active representation of her first client. More specifically, although advised by me to give some thought
to and discuss with the client the issue of risk to the children from
visitation with their alcoholic, violent father, she more than once
neglected to address the issue. Eventually she acknowledged that her
personal history of growing up with an alcoholic, abusive father,
m'de it difficult for her to advocate strongly for these children.
In this case, the student was able to see that her ambivalence
toward the case and reticence as an advocate was partly due to the
inhibiting impact of her own past. This type of understanding is rare,
but valuable. Awareness of one's own "blocks" can enable one to
compensate for unconscious inhibitions, by means of conscious actions. Moreover, this kind of self-knowledge is important to students'
decisions about their future careers."
D.

Challenges and Limitations

Inevitably, there are challenges and difficulties in integrating the
approach of another discipline into a professional training program.
Some of these issues which have surfaced in the DVAP this year can
be essentially summarized as the challenges of integrating psychology
into legal training, and are discussed infra part III.D.1. In addition,
both because questions of role are implicit in the collaboration of two
professionals in the training of lawyers, and because legal interviewing and counseling is so frequently compared to psychological interviewing and counseling," 7 infra part llI.D.2 offers some preliminary
thoughts on the differences between the two professional roles. Although issues of this sort arose little if at all in the DVAP, probably
because of the particular backgrounds and approaches of Dr. Dutton
and myself, as a general matter, interdisciplinary supervision of the
sort recommended herein suggests the importance for both supervisors
and students of being conscious about the definition of the lawyer's
role, and possible differences between that and the role of psychological professionals.

186. In this case, the student felt confirmed in her commitment to work on domestic
violence issues, but also decided that she would avoid individual casework in the near future.
187. But cf. supra note 129.
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1. Integrating Psychology into Legal Training
As described earlier, the goal of the DVAP's "psychosocial"
classes is to introduce the students to case analysis from a psychosocial perspective, i.e., to develop their understanding of the battered

woman's participation in the legal process in context of her personal
history, the social and psychological context in which she lives, and

the interpersonal context defining the attorney-client relationship.
Ideally, this perspective can better equip the students to deal with
potentially difficult aspects of lawyering for battered women, such as

their frequent apparent lack of cooperation in the case, ambivalence
about proceeding, ambiguity in their communications, etc.' However, because the broader "psychosocial" approach differs profoundly
from standard "legal" discourse, any interdisciplinary clinic needs to
give some thought to how to "socialize" students into this new way

of thinking.'89
This became quickly evident when, in the beginning of the year,
a number of students in the DVAP were less enthusiastic than I about
the prospect of a psychologist co-teaching the clinic. In private, one
student said "I thought I was learning to become a lawyer; why do

we need a psychologist?" In class, another expressed difficulty seeing
any connection between Dr. Dutton's psychosocial model and the
students' cases. Finally, as noted earlier, several students seemed
unwilling or unable to incorporate social science readings into their
arguments in their cases, even when they were directly relevant.
Although these responses may well have been situation-specific,191

188. See generally supra part Il.C.l, for some examples of these issues arising in DVAP
cases.
189. I am grateful to Mary Ann Dutton for her clarification and crystallization of this approach. Supervising lawyers need some "socializing" into the psychosocial approach as well!
190. See supra part III.B.I.
191. Some of the comments may have been partly a function of the fact that because we
had not been certain we would receive the necessary funding, we had not mentioned Dr.
Dutton's participation until it was a fait accompli. This was one month into the semester, and
took the students by surprise.
It is also possible that some student resistance to this approach may stem from
students' discomfort with psychological issues generally. The typical law student, like the
typical person, is not necessarily psychologically introspective. Educating students to the importance of understanding both their own and others' psychological responses requires cultivating an openness and willingness to risk the vulnerability inherent in dealing with personal
feelings. In the DVAP, this process begins only after two years of legal education has inculcated students into the importance of setting aside their own feelings in order to become
lawyers. It is thus likely that the degree to which the psychological approach "takes" will be
ultimately determined by the individual students' own predispositions.
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they alerted me to the need to be more explicit in setting the stage
for an interdisciplinary clinic. Based on our experience this year, for
those considering adopting a similar model, I offer the following
suggestions.
First, as in most teaching, the degree to which students will
"learn" this material is at least partly a function of clearly stating at
the outset what they are expected to learn, how, and why. It is thus
critical to introduce the interdisciplinary concept up front, to articulate
why both disciplines are so relevant to this work, and to spell out
concrete ways that they can utilize a collaborating psychologist. For
instance, students should be told that psychological questions will
crop up in their cases, e.g., whether a client might suffer from PTSD,
whether she is adequately caring for her children, whether she or the
abuser is mentally ill, how visitation with the abuser may affect the
children, what kinds of psychological counseling or assessment might
be available, etc. Such issues are prime issues to discuss with a consulting psychologist.'92 Assuming separate consultations with the
psychologist are part of the clinical plan, students should be told this
and given concrete examples of the purposes of those consultations,
e.g., (1) to consult on the psychosocial issues in the case, e.g., the
client's intentions, needs, and wishes, her social context, personal
history, etc., counseling or treatment issues for either the client or the
abuser, the needs of children, etc; (2) to discuss issues of lawyerclient communication, interviewing and counseling, e.g., understanding
the meta-message, understanding and dealing with client ambivalence,
understanding and counseling about safety, etc.; and (3) to discuss the
students' perspective on the clinical experience, their personal struggles with how to relate to the clients, the lawyering role, etc. Finally,
if social science materials are considered to be useful to legal issues
in students' cases, it may help to structure class exercises around precisely that: e.g., utilizing mock arguments or drafted motions which
use these materials.
In addition to being as explicit and concrete as possible up front
about the uses of a psychological professional, it is necessary
throughout the course to tie in psychosocial material to the students'
casework as much as possible. To a large extent, the psychological
issues arise naturally in the course of casework, as students find

192. For reasons that remain unclear, DVAP students did not always naturally raise these
issues with Dr. Dutton on their own, even when we discussed them in our legal supervision
sessions.
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themselves struggling to understand what the client does and doesn't
want, what is best for her, and how to relate to her. In the classroom,
the connection between psychological material and lawyering needs to
be more explicitly articulated. Thus, most non-legal material should
be presented in context of problems and issues confronted by lawyers
in these cases.
For example, in one class, a pair of students roleplayed the direct examination they were preparing in their case. The class spontaneously raised the issue of whether testimony about sexual abuse
would ultimately benefit or hinder the client's case, in light of various possible implications it might raise in the mind of the judge. 93
This discussion offered the opportunity to explore (informally) psychosocial understandings of sexual abuse, of pregnancy, and of family
violence.
When attempting to convey somewhat abstract material, it is
critical to tie it in to the students' experience with their cases. Thus,
when in the first "psychosocial" class, one student questioned the
relevance of Dr. Dutton's psychosocial model, we identified several
points of intersection between aspects of the model and the students'
cases. For instance, one pair of students had described their clients as
ambivalent and passive, in connection with their lack of followthrough on legal action. Yet when we pushed, they identified many
instances of these clients utilizing a variety of non-legal "strategies
for coping," one element of the model. By looking beyond the purely
legal framework, we could see how the clients were not passive and,
rather than being ambivalent about stopping the violence, were ambivalent about taking legal action, for a number of good reasons.'94
2. Maintaining a Clear Definition of the Lawyer's Role
The DVAP model for integrating psychology into lawyering for
battered women incorporates insights from both forensic psychology

193. Specifically, the discussion revolved around whether the judge would be likely to be
more or less impressed by the abuser's violence, if the client stated that her current pregnancy was the result of rape. The class was divided between those who felt the visible pregnancy would magnify the severity of the violence, and those who thought it would soften it,
because of the benign associations the judge might have to pregnancy.
194. Dutton, supra note 4, at 1226-31. Even though we identified some of the clients'
coping strategies, the students may have retained their view that the client's failure to take
legal action meant she was passive and ambivalent. A certain degree of conviction that legal
action is all that matters, is too often cultivated in law school. Unpacking notions such as
this is part of the "unlearning" process which clinical programs and practice experience can
offer.
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(i.e., substantive psychological knowledge about domestic violence)
and clinical psychology (i.e., interviewing, counseling, understanding
clients and oneself). With respect to the latter, most writers about the
psychology of lawyer-client interaction have relied extensively on an
analogy to "helping" or therapeutic relationships, i.e., the relationship
between a psychotherapist and patient.'95 However, few have explored the differences between the therapist-client and lawyer-client
relationship. In our experience in the DVAP, any such differences
have been of little consequence because Dr. Dutton and I share similar conceptions of the lawyering role, presumably due to her extensive
experience with legal cases, legal thought on these issues, and lawyering in the field, as well as my knowledge of the psychology field.
However, this may not be the case for all psychological and legal
professionals in our positions. Moreover, even where it is the case,
the process of thinking through the differences between the lawyer's
and therapist's roles can help to clarify many aspects of the lawyer's
role as well. This clarification is important in the training context:
law students need a meaningful conception of the lawyer's role in
order to productively incorporate the insights of psychology into that
role.
Presumably because in-depth examinations of interdisciplinary
work in law schools are still relatively rare, the difference between
the disciplines of law and psychology has barely been explored in the
literature. Stephen Ellman, in his exploration of the difference and
overlap between "empathy" and "approval" in the lawyer-client relationship, suggests that the oft-cited analogy of lawyer-client relationships to therapeutic relationships may be overblown. The differences
which Ellman briefly explicates include the contrast between the
therapist's lack of need for (most) decisions and the lawyer's need for
decisions; the lesser need for vulnerable expression of the client's
most intimate personal feelings in the legal interview than in the
therapy context; the different source of vulnerability between therapy
patients (whose vulnerability toward the therapist is fundamentally

195. See supra note 129. Perhaps because application of psychological models was so
new when they were writing, those clinical writers advocating the analogy have tended to
focus merely on the points of parallel, and not on the differences which might weaken the
utility of the therapeutic model. See, e.g., BASTRESs & HARBAUGH, supra note 122, at 19-57
(describing different psychiatric treatment models); BINDER Er AL., supra note 122, at 60-63
(citing psychologist Goodman's work); Cahn & Schneider, supra note 121, at 378-79
(analogizing the transfer of a legal client from one lawyer to another to the transfer of a
psychiatric patient from one therapist to another and applying a psychiatric model).
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psychological) and legal clients (whose vulnerability toward the lawyer is more likely to derive from socio-economic or contextual differences); and the fact that lawyers must involve themselves in actions
affecting third parties at the behest of clients, whereas therapists typically are expected to take no action on behalf of their patients."%
In this Article, my discussion is necessarily tentative and incomplete, as such differences can be expected to surface (or disappear)
increasingly over time. Nonetheless, building on Ellman's analysis, I
would identify at least three pertinent areas where differences in the
roles of psychological and legal professionals give rise to differences
in how they need to interact with their clients, and which should
inform the interdisciplinary approach to a clinical program.
To identify the differences one must start by defining the two
professional roles. The analogy between therapists and lawyers stems
from their common commitment to "helping" or serving individuals
who are their clients. This commonality is profound; indeed, the
lawyer's role as "advocate" for the client is probably the most essential aspect of her role, and the fundamental attribute of the therapeutic
role is the therapist's unconditional acceptance of and commitment to
the patient on a psychological level. Nonetheless, the methods which
lawyers and therapists use to help their clients differ profoundly. At
root, the lawyer's role is to act as an advocate for the client vis a vis
other people and institutions in the world. The therapist's role is
characterized primarily by his or her limitation to private, confidential
communication only with the patient, as a supportive listener in an
isolated one-on-one interaction, without communication or advocacy in
the larger world on the patient's behalf. From this fundamental difference flow several potential differences in the way the professional
roles must be played out with clients.
a. Goals and Methods of Information-Gathering
First, the difference in methods means that psychologists and
lawyers need information for different purposes. Psychological professionals need information to a large extent as an end in itself. Their
goal is to gain a full understanding of the patient's psychological and
emotional makeup and processes, to help the patient express his or
her feelings, and see or understand enough to be able to make desired
personal changes or cope with their life."9 Lawyers, on the other
196. Ellman, supra note 122, at 1012-15.
197. See HAROLD I. KAPLAN, M.D. & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, M.D., SYNOPSIS OF PSY-
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hand, need information so that they may take legal action on the
client's behalf in the legal system to achieve the client's goals.
Archetypally, in the trial context, lawyers need information to prove
the facts necessary to obtain the desired remedies from the court.
This difference in the need for and uses of information necessitate differing approaches to "interviewing" or interacting with clients.
Whereas psychological professionals are likely to be minimally interventionist in guiding the interchange with the patient (precisely because whatever the patient raises is relevant by definition), lawyers
often need to be able to focus the client on particular questions or
issues which need to be addressed in order to achieve the legal goals.
Lawyers also need to probe clients for the truth more aggressively
than do therapists. Often they need to play devil's advocate, or challenge (even hypothetically) the client's version of the facts, in order
to bring out conflicting information which may obstruct the case.
Lawyers also need to press their clients for the existence of other
corroborating or contradicting sources of information, such as third
party witnesses, documentary corroboration, etc. In contrast, the therapist must take the client's word for most things, as, even where the
facts may differ from the client's description, the therapeutic focus is
the client's perspective and feelings about things, more than the actual
facts.
In short, the lawyer's role in "interviewing" the client is both
narrower and broader than the therapist's role. It is narrower in that
only a limited portion of the client's life, feelings, or concerns are
relevant to the legal matter. It is broader in that the lawyer needs to
go beyond the client, to explore other sources of information.
These differences can be important in how one trains students.
With respect to the narrower aspect, clinical students must learn the
ability to focus an interview to obtain useful information as efficiently
as possible, and to distinguish between useful and less useful information, while also not unduly restricting the discussion. This requires a
clear conception of what information is useful to their legal representation of the client. A psychological professional's ideal interview
may range far more broadly, in ways that are at best tangentially
relevant the legal representation.'98

CHIATRY: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 573 (6th ed. 1991) (defining "insight-oriented psychotherapy" as helping patients gain "insights into the current dynamics of
their feelings, responses, behavior and, especially, current relations with other persons").
198. For example, a therapist may be expected to see inquiry into the client's childhood

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss4/4

68

Meier: Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal P
19931

INTEGRATING PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

With respect to the broader aspect, i.e., the lawyer's need to
search for "proof," corroboration, and contradictions of the client's
point of view, the lawyer's investigations into the external facts is
potentially more alienating to the client than the ideal therapeutic
exchange. The lawyer must confront the client with the weaknesses in
her case, must present her with the opposing party's or judge's potentially opposing perspectives, and must second-guess the client to some
extent.' 9 In the clinical teaching context, this means that law students need to learn not only "client-centered" interviewing and empathy for the client, but also an ability to stand back from the client's
perspective, to second-guess it, to critique it, and to prepare a case
which might withstand certain attacks. In short, in the legal context,

unlike the therapeutic context, confrontations of the client (albeit
sympathetic and gentle ones) are often necessary. This is far less
appropriate-if at all-in the therapeutic contest.
b. The Need for Lawyers to Take Action on Behalf of

Clients
As Stephen Ellman points out, the roles of therapists and lawyers
also differ profoundly with respect to the need for action by both the

client and the professional. Insofar as the lawyer's role requires her to
act "expressively" on behalf of the client, in ways that both affect her
own reputation and professional relationships, and also affect third

parties, she is personally involved in and affected by client decisions
far more than the typical therapist. The lawyer thus frequently must
discuss decisions, actions, and tactics with clients, sometimes engag-

upbringing as critical to the therapeutic endeavor. Such information is unlikely to serve any
useful purpose in the legal representation, although it might help the lawyer understand the
client's personality. Because in my experience law students in clinical training programs typically have the most trouble learning how to work with facts, including both developing the
facts from interviews, and learning how to marshal and interpret pertinent facts, it would be
easy for students to become side-tracked if they were encouraged to imitate the broader inquiry of therapists. In one DVAP case, the students were encouraged to explore the presence
of "sexual abuse" in the history of abuse of the client. They did so, and learned of a number of examples. However they uncritically incorporated those instances into their direct testimony, without any conscious analysis of how they were relevant or helpful to their case.
Subsequently, they decided to leave them out because they posed more problems than help
for the case. My view is not that the inquiry was irrelevant, but that students must be taught
to pursue any inquiry with an understanding of its use and relevance to the legal representation.
199. Many trial lawyers have experienced at some point being asked "whose side are you
on?" by a client, after they have attempted to explain the weaknesses in her case to prepare
her for cross-examination, or to explain the benefits of a compromise settlement.
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ing in persuasion or expressing her own views. In addition, the morally engaged lawyer may need to engage the client in "moral dialogue" with respect to actions desired by the client but about which

the lawyer feels moral qualms.Y
Moreover, the "active" role of the lawyer is in some ways less
well-defined than the purely "passive" role of the therapist; as a result
lawyers, at least in some fields, must constantly define and re-define
the boundaries of their role. The issue which arose with the student
whose client repeatedly asked her favors such as driving her children
to a party, is one example."' While most legal clients do not make
such requests of their lawyer, questions of role boundaries constantly
arise. Therapists are unlikely to be required to define and re-define
their roles to so great a degree.'r In the clinical context, this means that students must learn to
grapple consciously with questions of role boundaries, and with endlessly ambiguous moral and ethical dilemmas. Thus, whether
supervision is by a psychological professional or by a lawyer using
the therapeutic paradigm, it is critical that students be educated as to
the range of choices they must make in defining their role, which is
potentially far broader than in the therapeutic context.
c.

The Need for Clients to Make Decisions

The action orientation of legal representation also means that a
central part of the lawyer-client relationship entails assisting clients in

200. BINDER ET AL., supra note 122, at 358 (encouraging communication with client
about "immoral" decisions); see generally Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 63 (1980) (arguing for a conception of legal ethics in
which lawyers assume personal moral responsibility for the consequences of their professional
conduct).
201. See supra part III.C.l.b ("Case I").
202. This is not to suggest that therapists do not have to engage in boundary-drawing
and re-definition; they certainly do. See HERMAN, supra note 23, at 149-51 (discussing the
need for perhaps unusual flexibility in role boundary definition in therapists' work with abuse
survivors who may require certain gestures, signs, or actions from the therapist or themselves,
in order to obtain the trust and security to be able to heal). However, it is virtually universally accepted that a therapist's job entails meeting her clients in her office for a defined
period of time, typically at regular times, and sitting still and listening to them. Lawyers,
particularly those working with legal aid clients, must often negotiate whether and where
meetings will take place, whether to assist the client in transportation, whether the children
can be there, how many meetings will be held, how long they will last, who else will be interviewed, whether they will put certain witnesses on the stand, etc. etc. The extent to which
one should befriend a client is also a frequent question. In other words, the range of conduct
entailed by the role is far clearer for the therapist than for the lawyer.
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making decisions, often quickly. This is in complete contrast to the
therapeutic relationship in which decisions regarding action by the
client are, if not discouraged, certainly not considered an integral
element of most mainstream types of psychotherapy.2 3 Most directly, this means that the lawyer-client relationship typically entails far
more "counseling" or input by the lawyer, than the typical therapistpatient relationship. Lawyers must, at a minimum, describe and interpret legal procedures and options, and the risks and consequences of
different tactics, so the client can make a timely "informed" choice
about these actions. Stephen Ellman suggests that one consequence of
this greater involvement of the professional in client decisions is that
overt expression of "approval" may be more appropriate and beneficial in the lawyer-client relationship than it has traditionally been
considered to be in the therapeutic relationship.' It may be posited
that another consequence is, very simply, the need for greater input
by the legal professional than the psychological professional. In short,
lawyers must learn how to "advise" clients. This means they must
develop their own abilities to assess legal options and consequences,
but also means developing a sensitivity to the boundaries between
appropriate "informing," "counseling" or "advising" and inappropriate
control over decisions which should be made by the client.
Taking all of these differences into account when there is interdisciplinary collaboration in a clinical program means that both the
collaborating psychologist and lawyer should be conscious of these
differences. The psychological professional needs to be able to identify for herself and the students, how her instincts or suggestions may
differ from those of a lawyer. The lawyer needs to be clear about the
differences so she does not adopt too uncritically the "therapeutic"
model of interviewing and counseling. Without conscious attention to
these differences, excess reliance on the therapeutic model may teach
law students to avoid second-guessing the client; to explore numerous
issues which are very relevant in the therapeutic or psychological

203. Strict Freudian analysts traditionally were trained to require the analysand to commit
to making no major life changes during the course of the analysis. See, e.g., KAPLAN &
SADOCK, supra note 197, at 573 (describing the rule of "abstinence" in psychoanalysis,

whereby patient postpones gratification of instinctual wishes so as to discuss them in treatment). Freud considered this necessary because analysis can bring up intense emotions which
may fuel desires which may ultimately be fleeting or not in the patient's best interests. Modem analysts tend not to require such a commitment, but often discourage patients from taking

action in immediate reaction to various stages of the analysis. Id.
204. Ellman, supra note 122, at 1011-12; see supra note 122.
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context, but are minimally if at all relevant in the legal context; and
may discourage a level of proactive, affirmative counseling which is
not part of the therapeutic interaction, but is necessary for effective
legal representation.
This discussion does not purport to be comprehensive or conclusive. Undoubtedly many more differences exist between the lawyerclient and therapist-patient relationship than are identified here, with
many more implications. However, at the least, it is clear that the
lawyer-client relationship calls for more of an active alliance between
lay-person and professional than the paradigmatic therapeutic "helping" relationship, on which many recent discussions of legal interviewing have been modeled. The ethical and practical aspects of the
relationship are necessarily different. These differences should be
taken into account in designing an interdisciplinary approach to
teaching a legal clinic.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is my belief that an interdisciplinary approach to domestic
violence is both valuable for battered women and increasingly inevitable. Lawyers and psychologists have collaborated extensively in domestic violence cases, and to a lesser extent in the literature, for quite
some time, and with very beneficial effect. However, the occasional
consultation with or retention of a psychological "expert" in a case is
only a fraction of the benefit to lawyers and their clients which can
be obtained from collaboration. Not only are lawyers for battered
women in need of a psychological framework for understanding domestic violence; sensitivity to psychological issues is also a significant
part of all effective lawyering, particularly lawyering for individual
clients in the family law field. Bringing these vital aspects of lawyering for battered women into the teaching of a legal clinic can
greatly enrich the students' learning processes, making them both
better advocates for battered women and better lawyers. At the same
time, the continual process of clarifying boundaries between the psychological model and the lawyering role can be enriching for both
lawyers and the psychologists who work with them. Ultimately, the
interdisciplinary collaboration can only help better society's understanding of battered women's lives.
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